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SEEKING MEANINGFUL NONPROFIT REFORM IN A POST 
SARBANES-OXLEY WORLD 
DANNÉ L. JOHNSON* 
PRELUDE 
John’s Morning1 
I don’t like her.  I am smart and I do not forget.  I do remember.  At 8 
o’clock I eat my first meal today that was fruit loops with sugar and milk.  No 
bananas, where are the bananas.  I make it myself. 
I was at the table in my room and Nathan, my friend, came to share.  We 
eat and laugh.  At 9 o’clock I brush my teeth.  1. Water, 2. toothpaste, 3. spit, 
4. drink, and I can watch TV.  But my TV don’t work.  I go to the big room 
downstairs for TV.  I am first.  I see my show and I sit in the big chair.  It is not 
too quiet.  I want quiet.  Lots of talking.  My show is funny.  I laugh.  No one 
makes me quiet.  They can’t see me. 
I want an apple.  No apple.  Where is the apple?  I get a tuna fish on bread.  
Lunchtime.  Not so good.  Miss Lisa make me eat and I make a happy plate.  I 
want more.  Miss Lisa say I will get a snack if I go and get dress.  I want my 
apple. 
All by myself I get dressed, I can do it.  1. Underwear clean, 2. undershirt, 
3. shirt, 4. shorts.  I go back for my apple.  Miss Lisa my apple?  No answer.  I 
am hungry.  My apple.  My apple.  I talk loud.  Listen to me.  My apple. 
I wait.  Count 1, 2, 3, 4.  Miss Lisa walk away.  I tell Miss Tina my apple.  
She mad at me.  She say I not smart.  She mean.  I remember my apple.  I don’t 
get nothing. 
* * * * 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law; former Chairperson of 
the Board of Directors of one of the largest nonprofit organizations in New York.  The author 
wishes to thank friends and colleagues whom she met while working as a nonprofit board 
chairperson including John Courtney, Co-Founder, Partnership for Family Supports and Justice at 
the Fund for Social Change, and Bonda Lee-Cunningham, Director, Members Services, 
Federation of Protestant Welfare Agencies.  She would also like to thank Anahaita N. Kotval, 
Managing Director and General Counsel, RBS Global Banking and Markets Americas, former 
Oklahoma City University School of Law students, Siobhan Barbee Acker, and Amy Buehrle, for 
research assistance, and Oklahoma City University for its support during the writing process. 
 1. John is a fictional character. 
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This is just a short part of John’s narrative about his life as a mentally 
retarded adult living in an independent living facility.  John is ignored and left 
to his own devices from the time that he awakes until one in the afternoon.  
John’s experiences are typical, but they should not be.  He is vulnerable to the 
facility’s other residents, staff, and third party providers.  People do not 
properly attend to John’s needs, and his interaction and activity levels are low. 
In New York, the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental 
Disabilities (“OMRDD”) states its mission to be: 
[T]o develop programs to further the prevention and early detection of mental 
retardation and developmental disabilities; to develop a comprehensive, 
integrated system of services which has as its primary purposes the promotion 
and attainment of independence, inclusion, individuality and productivity for 
persons with mental retardation and developmental disabilities; to serve the 
full range of needs of persons with mental retardation and developmental 
disabilities by expanding the number and types of community-based services 
and developing new methods of service delivery; and to improve the equity, 
effectiveness and efficiency of services for persons with mental retardation and 
developmental disabilities by serving persons in the community as well as 
those in developmental centers, by improving the conditions in developmental 
centers, and by establishing accountability for carrying out the policies of the 
State with regard to such persons.2 
* * * * 
Jeffery’s Afternoon3 
I’m going to run right out to Starbucks for a venti caramel latte with no 
foam.  It’s three in the afternoon and I just need to hang in here for a few more 
hours then I’m off to my board meeting.  It’s funny how I got hooked up with 
the board in the first place.  I’m thirty and looking for meaning in my life; I 
wanted to work in the community and to use my education for good.  I’m a do-
gooder. 
After I took a course on how to be a board member, I was placed on the 
board of a nonprofit agency that focuses on child development and other 
things.  There are numerous programs and sites.  I have been on the board for 
two years, and I still don’t know all of the stuff that we do.  The board meets 
three times each year, and we have a killer holiday party.  We always get a 
band, and the food is always great.  Sometimes we invite donors. 
I respect and totally trust the CEO.  Matt founded this agency fifteen years 
ago, and he has a tremendous vision of growth and opportunity.  The people in 
the agency seem like they know what’s going on.  They have been able to get 
 
 2. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 13.01 (2006). 
 3. Jeffery is a fictional character. 
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all sorts of state and federal contracts so that we can accommodate these 
programs. 
As might be expected, we have an auditor who keeps track of the money, 
and we have several bank accounts.  I am on the fundraising committee, and 
the other board members are really nice.  They have been around much longer 
than me.  When we meet, we spend time catching up with one another.  
Everyone always wants to know what cases I’m working on.  I ask them about 
their children and their jobs.  Matt’s a great leader; I guess he just needed a 
lawyer from Wall Street to make the agency look good.  So, here I am: smart, 
good-looking, single, a scratch golfer, and an attorney to boot. 
* * * * 
Jeffery and the other board members are ultimately responsible for guiding 
Matt’s agency and ensuring that John receives quality services.  Jeffery does 
not know John and seems to have limited knowledge about the agency.  Jeffery 
is young and enthusiastic about service.  He is certainly smart, but is failing at 
his responsibility as a board member. 
Jeffery might be surprised to know that the agency manages a budget of 
thirty-three million dollars per year.  These funds are restricted funds from 
city, state, and federal sources.  Each funding dollar is allocated.  Matt’s best 
friend is the accountant and he has been with the agency since it was founded, 
fifteen years ago.  The agency operates ten day cares and several residential 
facilities for people in the community with mental disabilities. 
Jeffery would also be surprised to know that recently the agency has come 
under fire from the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental 
Disabilities (“OMRDD”).  A tour of the facility where John lives revealed that 
there was a lack of security, frequent inappropriate visitation among the 
residents, misappropriation of resident funds, and no lock on the medicine 
cabinet.  Matt entered into a corrective action plan with OMRDD to cure these 
deficiencies and others in an effort to retain this lucrative government contract 
to provide services, without which the agency might not be able to meet its 
payroll. 
How could Jeffery know these things; should he; and how can he and the 
other board members respond to this situation?  Can the gap between John, 
service client, and Jeffery, a board member, be closed? 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate scandals have unfolded before our eyes.  The loss of pensions, 
corporate collapse, and subsequent prosecutions followed as the fallout of 
these transgressions.  The ethical and accountability crisis in the corporate 
sector is not isolated.  The personalities, ethical challenges, profiteering, and 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
190 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:187 
general lack of accountability and moral leadership found in the corporate 
setting plague all of society. 
Cross-pollination among corporations, charities, and small business, 
through savvy board members and executives, spreads corporate ethical norms 
and practices, both good and bad.  As a result of a number of highly publicized 
nonprofit scandals in recent years, many commentators are suggesting that the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), a body of legislation adopted 
to stem the tide of corporate scandal, could be a possible solution to the 
nonprofit woes. 
In this Article, I suggest that strong, ethical, and transparent nonprofit 
board governance, influenced by Sarbanes-Oxley, can strengthen nonprofits.  
But at the same time, some of the law’s rigorous reforms are not appropriate 
for all nonprofits.  Part I examines the role and strength of nonprofits in 
American society and the duties of nonprofit boards.  Part II discusses the 
environment that gave rise to Sarbanes-Oxley and reflects on the criticism and 
impact of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Part III explores nonprofit scandals and their 
similarity to past corporate scandals in terms of impact and the regulatory 
response that followed.  Part IV provides guidance to nonprofits considered in 
light of Sarbanes-Oxley requirements. 
I.  NONPROFITS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 
A. Nonprofits in the American Economy 
Nonprofit agencies play a significant role in the United States.  There are 
legal distinctions between the different types of nonprofit organizations, such 
as charitable and noncharitable, as well as different reporting requirements for 
each.4  These organizations primarily pursue social welfare missions, providing 
care for those members of society who cannot provide for their own well-
being.5  These charitable sentiments, and possibly also the birth of the modern 
nonprofit sector, date back to eighteenth century Europe as a religious and 
social method to address the impact of the Industrial Revolution.6  Before the 
 
 4. Many nonprofit agencies can apply to the IRS for an exemption from federal income 
taxes.  I.R.C. § 501 (2006). 
 5. Other nonprofits care for animals, encourage conservation, provide legal services, and a 
host of other good deeds. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006). 
 6. The YMCA was founded in 1844 in London to channel young men away from 
unhealthily pastimes and toward educational, religious, social, or physical pursuits.  YMCA, 
History of the YMCA Movement, http://www.ymca.net/about_the_ymca/history_of_the_ 
ymca.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).  In 1863, the Red Cross was founded.  ICRC, Discover the 
ICRC, 3–6 (2005), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/p0790.  The International Red 
Cross is a highly-respected humanitarian assistance organization that delivers rapid relief to 
societies affected by natural or man-made disasters.  Id. at 3.  The first nonprofit organization in 
the United States predates these social services organizations noted above.  In the 1600s, the 
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founding of the United States, early North American settlers formed churches, 
orphanages, schools, and other voluntary associations to address social ills.7  In 
1831, Alexis de Tocqueville lauded this American impulse to establish such 
organizations throughout the land.8 
While nonprofits have a long history in the United States, currently, 
nonprofit entities are divided broadly into two types: (1) charitable or public-
servicing9 and (2) noncharitable or member-servicing organizations.10  As 
established by the Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) organizations are 
divided into two smaller categories: public charities and private foundations.11  
A study by the Public Agenda, however, found that most donors define the 
nonprofit sector work almost exclusively as the work of charitable, human-
service organizations.12  The IRS defines certain organizations as “charitable” 
because they serve broad public purposes, including educational, health, 
charitable, religious, scientific, and literary activities, as well as the relief of 
poverty and other public benefit actions.13  This status permits donations to 
charities to be tax-deductible for the donor.14  Between the late 1960s and the 
 
clergy and the Massachusetts corporation struggled to govern the Harvard.  JOSIAH QUINCY, THE 
HISTORY OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY 1, 4 (1840).  These struggles set the tone for the roles of 
directors and board governance and were instrumental in establishing the duties of boards. 
 7. Paul Arnsberger et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective, SOI 
Bull., Winter 2007–08, at 105, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehistory.pdf. 
 8. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 596 (Penguin Books 2003). 
 9. Charitable nonprofits are most often characterized as “public service” organizations, and 
are recognized under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).  See also Arnsberger et al., supra note 7, at 105.  
Contributions to these organizations are tax deductible.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 10. Noncharitable nonprofits have also been described as “mutual benefit” organizations, 
and include, but are not limited to, labor unions, social clubs, chambers of commerce, and other 
organizations that could be characterized as promoting the interests of their members.  Arnsberger 
et al., supra note 7, at 106.  These organizations are recognized for tax purposes under I.R.C. §§ 
501(c)(4)–(23) (2006).  Donations to these organizations, with few exceptions, are not tax 
deductible.  See id. § 501(a). 
 11. Private Foundations are divided into operating private foundations (spending resources 
on charitable purposes) and nonoperating private foundations (engaged in grant making).  
Arnsberger et al., supra note 7, at 110. 
 12. Ana Maria Arumi et al., Summary of Findings, in THE CHARITABLE IMPULSE 5 (Public 
Agenda, New York, N.Y. 2005).  Donors seemed indifferent to foundations and surprised or 
resentful that hospitals and other large organizations that charged fees and made profits could be 
categorized as nonprofits.  Id. 
 13. I.R.S. Dept. of the Treasury Publication 557, Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization, 
at 19 (Rev. June 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf. 
 14. 26 U.S.C. § 170(a) (2006). 
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late 1990s, the number of nonprofit organizations in America grew 
dramatically.15 
NONPROFIT STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES16 
 1975 1985 1995 2000 2005 
REGISTERED 
NONPROFITS 
  1,066,808 1,211,937 1,514,821 
Registered 
Charitable 
§501(c)(3 
Organizations) 
  571,511 720,877 1,069,719 
a. Registered 
Public Charities 
  514, 865 642,137 956,760 
b. Registered 
Private 
Foundations 
  56,646 78,740 112,959 
Filing Charitable 
§501(c)(3 
Organizations) 
108,937 137,620 228,848 296,897 366,150 
a. Filing Public 
Charities 
82,048 106,449 180,931 230,159 286,615 
b. Filing Private 
Foundations 
26,889 31,171 47,917 66,738 79,535 
Registered 
Noncharitable 
§§501(c)(4)-(23) 
  492,438 489,791 443,464 
Filing 
Noncharitable 
§§501(c)(4)-(23) 
138,149     
 
The modern nonprofit sector is viewed very favorably overwhelmingly by 
Americans.  The nonprofit sector operates on the principles of voluntary 
service and community support through time and money.  Volunteerism is not 
uniquely American, but the diversity of services offered and the extent of 
 
 15. There are at least three factors that help explain nonprofit sector growth over this time 
period: (1) Increasing American affluence, (2) federal subsidies associated with Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society programs, and (3) the Civil Rights Movement.  David C. Hammack, 
Introduction: Growth, Transformation, and Quiet Revolution in the Nonprofit Sector Over Two 
Centuries, 30 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 157, 165 (2001). 
 16. These totals may not be exact due to rounding.  This chart was created by a table-
generating website.  See generally Nat’l Center For Charitable Stat., NCCS All Registered 
Nonprofits Table Wizard, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/tablewiz/tw_bmf.php (last visited Jan. 11, 
2010) (providing documentation of statistics regarding growth in nonprofit organizations). 
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public support is impressive.17  Approximately 90% of American families 
contribute to charity, and donated an average of $1,620 each in 2001.18  In 
2006, individuals, corporations, and foundations gave $295 billion in 
charitable contributions to nonprofits.19  Donors generally do not expect to 
receive benefits from their donations, but they do anticipate that their funds 
will be used to support the mission of the organization.20  Not only do 
Americans support nonprofits financially, over forty-four million, or nearly 
22% of adults, give their support by volunteering.21 
In 2005, the IRS recognized roughly 1.4 million nonprofit organizations, 
public charities, and private foundations—and that is not counting nearly half 
of the church congregations (approximately 175,000) that choose not to 
register with the IRS.22  Most nonprofit organizations registered with the IRS 
are public charitable organizations and exempt from taxes under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.23  Approximately one-third of these 
registered organizations, however, must report their financial data to the IRS.24  
Religious organizations and entities with less than $25,000 in gross receipts are 
not required to report data to the IRS.25 
 
 17. According to the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, the value of 
volunteer work in the U.S. is $109 million, leading both Germany and France with $48.4 million 
and $41.9 million respectively.  The John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, tbl.2 
(2004), http://www.ccss.jhu.edu/pdfs/CNP/CNP_table201.pdf.  Additionally, the U.S. ranks 
fourth for people volunteering with 44.5 million, or 22% of all adults.  Id.  Norway (52%), United 
Kingdom (30%), Sweden (28%), and Uganda (23%) lead the U.S. for percentage of adult 
population volunteerism.  Id. 
 18. INDEPENDENT SECTOR, GIVING & VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES: KEY 
FINDINGS 1, 3 (2001), available at http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/GV01keyfind.pdf. 
 19. KENNARD T. WING ET AL., THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 2008, at 70 (2008).  In 2005, 
individuals, corporations, and foundations gave $260 billion in charitable contributions to 
nonprofits.  THE URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: FACTS AND FIGURES FROM 
THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 2 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311373_ 
nonprofit_sector.pdf. 
 20. Arumi, supra note 12, at 10.  Many donors anticipate that they will receive a tax benefit 
from their donation in addition to the personal gratification from doing good.  WING ET AL., supra 
note 19, at 1. 
 21. LESTER M. SALAMON ET AL., GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 297 tbl.A.2 (2004). 
 22. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 139. 
 23. See id. at 139–40 tbl.5.1; 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).  Other types of tax-exempt 
organizations include social welfare organizations, labor and agricultural associations, business 
leagues, and fraternal beneficiary societies.  See 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(4)–(6), 501(c)(8). 
 24. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 140. 
 25. Id. at 140 tbl.5.1. 
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The financial impact of the nonprofit sector is significant.26  In 2005, all 
reporting nonprofits had assets in excess of $3.4 trillion and spent 
approximately $1.4 trillion.27  Contributions from individuals and major 
corporations support these nonprofits.  Each year several studies are conducted 
to determine their economic impact.28  A 2005 study of the nonprofit arts and 
culture industry suggests that this sector spends $63.1 billion dollars per year 
and generates more than $103 billion in additional economic activity.29 
In 2005, public charities reported nearly $1.1 trillion in total revenues, $2 
trillion in total assets, and $1.1 trillion in total expenses.30  Of the nearly $1.1 
trillion in total revenues, 21.3% came from contributions, gifts, and 
government grants, and 70.3% came from fees for goods and services, which 
consist of tuition payment and hospital patient revenues, including Medicare 
and Medicaid.31  Nonprofits accounted for over 8% of all wages and salaries 
paid in the United States in 2005.32  In 2004, nonprofits paid $321.6 billion in 
wages, compared to $355.8 billion in wages paid by the finance and insurance 
sectors combined.33  In 2005 and 2006, nonprofits accounted for 5% of gross 
domestic product.34 
 
 26. In 2007, the largest public charity was the President and Fellows of Harvard College, 
with approximately $57.9 billion in total assets.  National Center for Charitable Statistics, NCSS - 
Display Largest Public Charities, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/showTopOrgs.php 
(follow “All Orgs.” under “Total Assets) (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).  The top ten largest public 
charities in 2007 had approximately $237.9 billion in total assets.  Id. 
 27. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 140 tbl.5.1. 
 28. See, e.g., LESTER M. SALAMON ET AL., JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR CIVIL SOC’Y STUDIES 
& FLORIDA PHILANTHROPIC NETWORK, FLORIDA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: AN ECONOMIC FORCE, 
available at http://www.jhu.edu/ccss/research/ned/pdf/florida_report_final_3.18.08.pdf; PUBLIC 
SECTOR CONSULTANTS, INC., ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF FLORIDA NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD (2002), available at http://www.pnlc. 
rollins.edu/FloridaCompositeReport2002-04-22.pdf. 
 29. AMERICANS FOR THE ARTS, ARTS & ECONOMIC PROSPERITY 6, 9 (2008), available at 
http://www.artsusa.org/pdf/information_services/research/services/economic_impact/aepiii/nation
al_report.pdf.  “Nationally, the nonprofit arts and culture industry generates $166.2 billion in 
economic activity every year—$63.1 billion in spending by organizations and an additional 
$103.1 billion in event-related spending by their audiences.”  Id. at 3. 
 30. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 140 tbl.5.1.  These numbers represent reporting 
nonprofits that have more than $25,000 in gross receipts and are required to file with the IRS.  Id.  
In 2004, public charities reported nearly $1.1 trillion in total revenues and $981 billion in total 
expenses.  THE URBAN INST., supra note 19, at 3 tbl.2. 
 31. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 143–45. 
 32. Id. at 20. 
 33. LESTER M. SALAMON & S. WOJCIECH SOKOLOWSKI, JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR CIVIL 
SOC’Y STUDIES NONPROFIT EMPLOYMENT DATA PROJECT, EMPLOYMENT IN AMERICA’S 
CHARITIES: A PROFILE 3 (2006), available at http://www.jhu.edu/ccss/research/pdf/Employment 
%20in%20Americas%20Charities.pdf. 
 34. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 20. 
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In the United States, the nonprofit sector is a major employer, employing 
more people than utility, wholesale trade, and construction industries 
combined.35  This workforce segment is comprised of 9.4 million paid and 4.7 
million unpaid volunteers, equaling 10.5% of the total U.S. workforce.36  In 
addition, the nonprofit sector plays a leading role in the fields of health and 
hospital care, social assistance, and higher education.37 
In Florida, nonprofits are the fourth largest employment sector, providing 
630,000 jobs as of the second quarter of 2005.38  In Miami-Dade County, 
Florida, nonprofits are the third-largest employment sector, providing 76,741 
jobs.39  In Iowa, charitable nonprofit employment is the fifth-largest 
employment sector, providing approximately 129,000 jobs in 2005.40  Between 
2002 and 2004, while employment overall was down by 0.2%, employment in 
the nonprofit sector increased by 5.3% for paid and volunteer workers.41  The 
annual budget of the entities that compose the nonprofit sector in the United 
States, such as the private sector, public sector, and nonprofit organizations, 
surpasses the national budgets of nearly every other country in the world.42  In 
2005, all reporting nonprofits declared combined revenue of $1.6 trillion.43 
Nonprofits are an integral part of American society.  These organizations 
provide services, employ many people, and contribute to the national economy.  
Considering the impact that nonprofits have on the economy, it is surprising 
that the majority are managed by volunteer boards of directors working with 
nonprofit staff. 
A. Directors and Their Role in Nonprofits 
State law divides corporations into profit, or “for-profit” corporations, and 
nonprofit, or “not-for-profit” corporations.  A for-profit corporation, generally, 
is a legal entity incorporated in the state where part of the income or profit is 
 
 35. SALAMON & S. SOKOLOWSKI, supra note 33, at 3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 10. 
 38. Id. at 33. 
 39. DADE CMTY. FOUND., SECTOR OF IMPACT II: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NONPROFITS IN 
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY 2, 5–6 (2006), available at http://www.dadecommunityfoundation.org/ 
Site/docs/2006%20Sector%20of%20Impact.pdf. 
 40. JILL SMITH ET AL., UNIV. OF IOWA & IOWA DEP’T OF ECON. DEV., THE IMPACT OF 
CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS ON IOWA’S ECONOMY & QUALITY OF LIFE 4, 15 
(2007), available at http://www.iowalifechanging.com/downloads/char_giving_report_FINAL-
02-01-2007.pdf. 
 41. SALAMON & S. SOKOLOWSKI, supra note 33, at 6. 
 42. Dorothy D. Freeman & Michael R. Payne, The Billion Dollar Impact: Kent County 
Profits in 1999, http://www.gvsu.edu/cms3/assets/C6EE62EC-E0C1-54F2-D0212D5174A27DA 
F/pdf/billiondollar.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 43. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 140 tbl.5.1. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
196 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:187 
distributable to its members, directors, or officers.44  In other words, the 
primary goal of a for-profit corporation is to make a profit.  A profit is a 
tangible or pecuniary benefit such as dividends, interest, capital accounts, or 
salaries—or it may be a saving of expense which one would otherwise incur.45  
A not-for-profit corporation is a legal entity incorporated in the state, where no 
part of the income or profit is distributable to its members, directors, or 
officers.  Unlike the revenue driven goal of for-profit organizations, nonprofit 
organizations exist for reasons other than monetary gain. 
Both for-profit and not-for-profit corporations require a board of directors.  
Directors are “person[s] appointed or elected to sit on a board that manages the 
affairs or a corporation.”46  The board of directors is a governing body that 
should reflect a spectrum of public interests and be responsible for 
management and operation of the corporation.  There are three ways to select 
directors.47  First, the members of the organization can elect directors from a 
list of candidates.48  Second, directors may be selected through the use of a 
self-perpetuating process.49  Under this system, the existing board members 
can elect or re-elect directors.50  Third, and finally, directors may serve “ex 
officio by virtue of holding another position, such as chief executive of the 
corporation, or officer of an affiliate organization or constituency group.”51  
Directors, once on the board, can be assigned roles and advance in terms of 
board leadership based on their status, seniority, or affiliation.52  At the 
meetings, the board can take action in two ways.53  One, it may hold a meeting 
with a quorum,54 meaning a meeting with a minimum number of the members 
present and voting.55  Two, it may act with written consent of the voting 
directors.56 
Generally, boards are engaged in monitoring management, approving 
major transactions, and giving direction to the organization.  Both types of 
 
 44. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 367 (8th ed. 2004). 
 45. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Nonprofit Purposes and Character Which Warrant 
Creation of Nonprofit Corporation, 16 A.L.R.2d 1345, 1347–48 (2004). 
 46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 492–93 (8th ed. 2004). 
 47. COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS, GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT 
CORPORATIONS 4 (George W. Overton & Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS, supra note 47, at 5–6. 
 53. LISA RUNQUIST, THE ABC’S OF NONPROFITS 81 (2005). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Bylaws of organization can provide alternative calculations for a quorum.  David M. 
Bardsley, Committees, in NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 127 (Victor Futter et al. 
eds., 2002). 
 56. RUNQUIST, supra note 53, at 81. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] SEEKING MEANINGFUL NONPROFIT REFORM 197 
 
boards, for-profit and nonprofit, are guided by similar legal principles, 
involving the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.57  Courts presume that 
directors have specialized skill and knowledge to manage the affairs of 
organizations, and would rather not substitute their judgment for that of their 
boards when legal disputes arise.58  The Business Judgment Rule protects 
individual directors from personal liability when making board decisions in 
good faith and with due care.59  The rule presumes that, in the absence of self-
interest, directors act in good faith and with due care,60 and courts need not 
perform a “substantive review of the merits of a business decision made by 
directors acting without self-dealing and in good faith and with due care.”61 
While the Business Judgment Rule is a safe harbor from director liability, 
it is not absolute.62  In cases of self-dealing,63 a failure to act,64 or where action 
or inaction is shown to be a gross abuse of discretion,65 directors cannot rely on 
the protection of the Business Judgment Rule.66  All boards have two legal 
duties to the corporation: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.67  Nonprofit 
boards have a third additional legal duty to the corporation: a duty of 
 
 57. COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., supra note 47, at 19. 
 58. Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 59. See EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE, OFFICERS, 
AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES & LIABILITIES § 2:10 (2009) (citing Grobow v. Perot, 539 
A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988)), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 
2000); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986); Fischel & 
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 283–84 (1986). 
 60. BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 59, § 2:10. 
 61. Id. (citing In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A.2d 770, 780–781 (Del. 
Ch. 1988)), appeal denied, 540 A.2d 1089 (Del. 1988), appeal denied, 540 A.2d 1088 (Del. 
1988); Matter of Munford, 98 F.3d 604 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1068 (1998) 
(applying Georgia law) (“The business judgment rule protects directors and officers from liability 
when they make good faith business decisions in an informed and deliberate manner.”). 
 62. See BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 59, § 2:10. 
 63. Id. at n.22 (citing Solash v. Telex Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶93,608, 97,727, 1988 
WL 3587 (Del. Ch. 1988); Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 956 (Del. Ch. 1980); David 
J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int’l, 249 A.2d 427, 430, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968); Gries Sports Enters. v. 
Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959, 965 (Ohio 1986); In re Dollar Time Group, 223 
B.R. 237, 248 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998); Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, 2000 WL 238026 (Del. Ch. 
2000)). 
 64. Wisconsin, 2000 WL 238026, at *9 n.27 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 
(Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)). 
 65. Id. (citing Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988), overruled on other grounds 
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)). 
 66. Id. § 2.10. 
 67. BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 59, § 2:70. 
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obedience.68  These common law fiduciary responsibilities ensure that boards 
act in a manner consistent with the organization’s mission and purpose. 
1. The Duty of Care 
The board has a duty to make rational decisions, in good faith, with 
reasonable care.69  Reasonable care means that an ordinary prudent person in 
the same situation would reasonably believe that the decision made is 
appropriate.70  The duty of care first requires that a director be informed; 
second, a director must discharge his duties in good faith.71  The directors are 
held to a standard that demands “the most scrupulous observance of [their] 
duty” and “to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the 
corporation.”72  Also, directors should efficiently allocate time to making 
board decisions.73 
To ensure the duty of care is met, the corporation should observe corporate 
formalities.74  The board should hold regular meetings.75  Before meetings, the 
board should, within budget and staff resources limitations, distribute the 
meeting agenda, the rules of meeting procedure, and other information needed 
to make decisions.76  The board should keep good records of the meeting 
minutes and committee reports and distribute them after the meetings are 
held.77 
2. The Duty of Loyalty 
Directors of a corporation owe a duty of loyalty to the corporation.78  This 
is a fiduciary duty to act for the best interest of the nonprofit corporation and 
 
 68. David B. Rigney, Duties and Potential Liabilities of Officers and Directors of Nonprofit 
Organizations, in NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 83 (Victor Futter et al. eds., 
2002). 
 69. COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., supra note 47, at 19. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, DEL. ANN. 
tit. 8, § 102(b) (2001), and overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 
(Del. 2009). 
 72. COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., supra note 47, at 19. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See RUNQUIST, supra note 53, at 80. 
 75. Id. at 26. 
 76. Id. at 27.  Nonprofit boards are discouraged from using Robert’s Rules of Order.  See 
ANDY ROBINSON, GREAT BOARDS FOR SMALL GROUPS 53–56 (2006); Pamela McAllister, 
Should You Use Robert’s Rules of Order?, 20 NONPROFIT WORLD 4, 6 (2001).  Also, the 
procedure may be best distributed in a manual for meetings. 
 77. See COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., supra note 47, at 27–28 (explaining that minutes 
should include, at a minimum, the names of all attendees, details of voting outcomes, and any 
materials relied on by the board in reaching a decision when a conflict of interest exists). 
 78. Id. at 19. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] SEEKING MEANINGFUL NONPROFIT REFORM 199 
 
stands in opposition to acting with self-interest or in the interest of another.79  
It prohibits directors from engaging in fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing, and 
from usurping an opportunity that belongs to the corporation.80 
If there is a possibility of a conflict of interest, the director must disclose 
all relevant facts about the potential conflict, including the director’s personal 
interest in the transaction.81  A conflict occurs when a director or an officer is 
in a position where there is a duty to act in the best interest of the corporation 
and a duty or the ability to act in the interest of another, possibly his or her 
own.82  The director with the possible conflict has a duty not to vote—thus 
only disinterested directors may vote.83  In order for a transaction to occur in 
favor of the individual director over the organization, the individual director 
must demonstrate, and the rest of the board must agree, that the transaction is 
fair in terms of price and process.84  Otherwise the interested director must 
abstain from the transaction.85 
To ensure that directors comply with the duty of loyalty, the corporation 
should adopt policies concerning potential conflicts of interest.  Directors 
should be required to disclose business relationships and transactions with 
other individuals and organizations that might pose a conflict.  Corporations 
should also require that directors adhere to policies regarding gifts and other 
activities that might lead to the appearance of impropriety. 
3. The Duty of Obedience86 
Third, the nonprofit board members have a duty of obedience.  This is a 
duty to advance the mission and goals of the nonprofit corporation.87  It differs 
 
 79. Id. at 29. 
 80. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); U.S. West v. Time 
Warner Inc., No. 14555, 1996 WL 307445, at *21 (Del. Ch. June 6, 1996). 
 81. COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., supra note 47, at 30–31, 33; RUNQUIST, supra note 53, 
at 73. 
 82. COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., supra note 47, at 30. 
 83. Id. at 33. 
 84. Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets 
Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 396–97 (2003). 
 85. Reza Dibadj, Networks of Fairness Review in Corporate Law, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 
5 (2008) (quoting Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Theoretical Fiduciary Decision Making—Some 
Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 61 (1985)); see also Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency 
of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 396–97 
(2003); see Corporate Director’s Guidebook, Third Edition, 56 BUS. LAW. 1571, 1584 (2001) 
(noting the interested director must gain board approval before undertaking the transaction). 
 86. The phrase “duty of obedience” has also been used to discuss the duty of the 
organization to comply with use restrictions that donors place on gifts to the organization.  
Jeremy Benjamin, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors’ Duty of Obedience, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1677, 1680 (2009).  “Duty of obedience,” however, is inapplicable here. 
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from the duty of care in that the duty of care addresses the level of competency 
with which directors must act.88  It also differs from the duty of loyalty in that 
the duty of loyalty requires directors to put the interests of the organization 
ahead of their personal interests.89  Litigation regarding the duty of obedience 
occurs as much as litigation on the duty of care and duty of loyalty.90  The 
overriding duty in the nonprofit context is that “[t]he purpose of every act and 
decision of a director should be to advance the nonprofit’s purpose.”91 
Charities provide benefits to the public.  These organizations achieve this 
goal by creating a mission to guide their efforts.92  Directors must adhere to the 
mission in the way it was written and designed.93  To ensure that the duty of 
obedience is met by directors, corporations should conduct mission-based 
governance training for board members and should adopt mission-based 
policies.  Staff and directors must be able to affirm that their actions are 
performed in an effort to further the corporation’s mission. 
B. Given Similar Legal Duties and Responsibilities, Are Nonprofit and For-
Profit Boards Different? 
Both for-profit and nonprofit boards are charged with managing and 
monitoring their organizations.94  Management of a complex organization 
creates challenges for even the most dedicated board member.  The manner in 
which these responsibilities are communicated to and understood by board 
members and supported by the organization has an impact on board activities, 
engagement, and efficiency.  A comparison of these two types of boards in 
terms of experience, compensation, and resources, is a study in contrast. 
1. For-Profit Board Members Receive Services 
For-profit board members are a somewhat incestuous group.  Many 
directors serve on several prominent boards and refer themselves and their 
friends to sit on other boards with vacancies.95  The benefits from this process 
are numerous.  For example, for-profit board members have an opportunity to 
learn from past experiences, have access to mentoring, and practice being a 
good board member through experience.96  These board members can also 
form peer groups for discussion and educational purposes.  In some instances, 
 
 87. Rigney, supra note 68, at 87. 
 88. Id. at 84–85. 
 89. Id. at 86. 
 90. DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 84 (1988). 
 91. RUNQUIST, supra note 53, at 18. 
 92. KURTZ, supra note 90, at 85. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text. 
 95. See infra note 115–19 and accompanying text. 
 96. See infra note 115–19 and accompanying text. 
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prior board service is a proxy for formal board training.  Such nonprofit board 
experience, however, is not necessary, because for-profits can pay for board 
member training courses for new, inexperienced board members.97 
On average, publicly-traded companies compensate their full board of 
directors just over $1 million per year.98  Compensation plans for board 
members vary by company and nature of service.99  Compensation can include 
stipends, attendance fees, stock options, and equity awards.100  Additional 
compensation may be available for certain committee services and positions 
held on certain committees.101  In some instances, the compensation level can 
signal a member about the quality and quantity of time that should be devoted 
to board activities.  In 2004, an average compensation for the for-profit board 
chairperson that meets quarterly and serves as an audit committee member was 
 
 97. Directors’ Consortium is a board member training course offered by the University of 
Chicago Booth School of Business, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford Law School, 
and the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth.  Stanford Graduate School of Business, Director’s 
Consortium (2008), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/exed/directors/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).  This 
program teaches board members the importance of knowing their duties, in light of regulatory 
changes.  Id.  The program reaches both new and experienced directors, showing them how to 
make informed, complex decisions, and the comprehensive actions that must be taken in reaching 
these decisions.  Id.  Stanford offers a three-day course for $7500 or a four-day combination 
course for $8700.  Id..  Harvard Business School offers a course in Making Corporate Boards 
More Effective.  Harvard Business School, Making Corporate Boards More Effective (2008), 
http://www.exed.hbs.edu/programs/mcb/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).  This program offers 
directors of public companies the opportunity to learn strategies and techniques on how to 
strengthen board effectiveness by learning how to maximize the knowledge and time of each of 
its own board members.  See id.  In 2009, the program was anticipated to cost $7750, and in 2010, 
another $8000.  Id.  Previous companies such as Adobe Systems, Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company, and Motorola have participated in this program.  Id. at http://www.exed.hbs.edu/ 
programs/mcb/print.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 98. Matthew Scott, Surprise: Boards Are Not Overpaid, FIN. WEEK, at 1, Mar. 24, 2008, 
available at http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080324/REG/1497030 
72/1004/TOC; see also GREG RUEL & PAUL HODGSON, THE CORPORATE LIBRARY’S ANNUAL 
DIRECTOR PAY SURVEY, DIRECTOR PAY 10 (Feb. 2009).  The results are based on proxy filings 
made before August 1, 2008. 
 99. See Scott, supra note 98. 
 100. See id.; RUEL & HODGSON, supra note 98, at 3, 10. 
 101. Jill Jusko, Board of Directors’ Compensation Not ‘Unreasonable,’ Study Finds, 
INDUSTRY WEEK, March 24, 2008, http://www.industryweek.com/ReadArticle.aspx?ArticleID= 
16015; see ANNALISA BARRETT, THE CORPORATE BOARD, DIRECTOR PAY 2006–2007 VOLUME 
II: COMPENSATION PAID TO THE FULL BOARD (2008).  Northrop Grumman’s eleven board 
members received a $200,000 retainer, plus additional fees for sitting on the company’s audit and 
compensation committees.  Matthew Scott, supra note 98.  Current director compensation policy 
at Gilead Sciences Inc. includes a $40,000 retainer for a director with no committee service.  
Service as a committee member warrants an additional $20,000 in cash fees, as does service as 
committee chair.  RUEL & HODGSON, supra note 98, at 12, 13, 29. 
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$55,000 per year, excluding stock options and reimbursement for expenses.102  
A recent study of 3,096 publicly-traded corporations’ proxy statements 
indicated that “about one quarter of the companies studied paid less than 
$500,000 in total compensation to its full board.”103  The top-ten most highly 
compensated boards for 2007 range from a high of almost $16.5 million at 
Valero Energy Corporation to just over $8 million for the board of News 
Corporation.104  In 2007, the study showed that Valero Energy spent more than 
$16 million on its board, with $15 million going to a single director, William 
E. Greehey,105 and “that six companies offered their full board a cash bonus 
based on company performance.”106  The study also noted that the practice of 
establishing stock ownership guidelines for directors is growing, and that such 
awards are generally correlated with a company’s size and expensed 
earnings.107  The amount of total board compensation varied based on 
company size.108  While these payments to for-profit boards may not be 
unreasonable,109 these payments are certainly out of line with the compensation 
available to directors of nonprofits.110 
For-profit boards are often aware of accountability pressures exerted from 
shareholders.  In addition to compensation and the pressure of accountability, 
for-profit boards are routinely provided with legal counsel.111  Directors 
affiliated with the corporation normally rely on corporate counsel, while 
unaffiliated directors are provided with independent counsel.112  In each 
instance, board members are not only encouraged to have counsel review 
 
 102. Culpepper, Board of Director Compensation Shifts: More Cash, Less Options, May 11, 
2004, http://www.culpepper.com/eBulletin/2004/MayCompensationArticle.asp. 
 103. Jusko, supra note 101; see BARRETT, supra note 101. 
 104. RUEL & HODGSON, supra note 98, at 10. 
 105. Id. at 13; Joseph McCafferty, Boards Hit the $1 Million Dollar Mark, Mar. 19, 2008, 
DIRECTORSHIP.COM, http://www.directorship.com/boards-earn-an-avereate-of-mor (discussing 
Greehey’s 2006–07 pay). 
 106. RUEL & HODGSON, supra note 98, at 2. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. McCafferty, supra note 105; see RUEL & HODGSON, supra note 98, at 10. 
 110. Jusko, supra note 101; see BARRETT, supra note 101.  Northrop Grumman’s eleven 
board members received a $200,000 retainer, plus additional fees for sitting on the company’s 
audit and compensation committees.  Scott, supra note 98. 
 111. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are 
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1612 (2005) (describing how corporate counsel 
regularly inform directors of their fiduciary duties). 
 112. See Jeffrey J. Haas & Steven R. Howard, The Heartland Funds’ Receivership and Its 
Implications for Independent Mutual Funds Directors, 51 EMORY L.J. 153, 193 (2002) 
(discussing changes made to the SEC’s regulation of independent mutual fund directors). 
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board materials, but also to seek the advice of counsel when making 
decisions.113 
Not only are for-profit boards compensated at a level that encourages focus 
and attention to detail, they are also provided with counsel to explain matters 
taken up by the board and, as protection against personal liability, the directors 
have Director and Officer Insurance.114  The pillars of compensation, legal 
counsel, and insurance associated with for-profit board service enhance 
efficiency, productivity, and limit personal liability. 
2. Nonprofit Board Members Are There to Serve 
It is not unusual for the incestuous director relationship, common in the 
for-profit sector, to be replicated on nonprofit boards: “The potential for the 
intersection among for-profit boards and nonprofit boards exists.”115  For 
 
 113. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The 
Emergence of the Independent Directors’ Counsel, 59 BUS. LAW. 1389 (2004) (discussing the 
development and role of independent counsel for independent directors in the boardroom). 
 114. Directors and Officer Insurance (“D&O”) is often confused with Error and Omission 
insurance.  D&O Insurance is concerned with the performance and duties of management.  
Matthew S. Chambers, Last Ditch Options: An Assessment of Independent Director Liability and 
a Proposal for Congressional Action in Light of the Employee Stock Option Backdating Scandal, 
42 GA. L. REV. 569, 587 (2008).  It can include coverage for employment practices, including 
harassment and discrimination suits, as well as fiduciary liability.  Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, 
New Direction for Shareholder Environmental Activism: The Aftermath of Caremark, 31 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 163, 171 (2006) (“Director and Officer insurance policies make 
it unlikely that a director will be forced to pay for fiduciary breaches.”). 
 115. Two additional examples of this cross-pollination are Faye Wattleton and Brad Boston.  
Faye Wattleton is co-founder and president for the Center for the Advancement of Women 
(CFAW), an independent, women focused, national opinion research, education, and advocacy 
corporation.  See Center for the Advancement of Women, http://www.advancewomen.org/ 
discover/media_center/presidents_bio/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).  As noted on the CFWA 
website: 
From 1978 to 1992, as president of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America 
(PPFA), Ms. Wattleton played a leading role in defining the national debate over 
reproductive rights and health, and in shaping family planning policies and programs 
around the world.  Ms. Wattleton presently serves on the boards of directors of Columbia 
University, New York Blood Center, Jazz at Lincoln Center, Pardee RAND Graduate 
School and the United Nations Association of the United States of America.  Ms. 
Wattleton formerly served on the board of directors of Estée Lauder Companies as 
chairperson of the audit & nominating and board affairs committees, as well as, formerly 
serving on the board of directors of Well-Choice, Inc, Savient Pharmaceuticals and the 
Quidel Corporation. 
Id. 
 Brad Boston has served as a member of Active Power, Inc. Board of Directors since March, 
2005.  Active Power Elects Cisco Senior VP and CIO Boston to its Board, GREENJOBS.COM, Mar. 
18, 2005, http://www.greenjobs.com/Public/newsitems/news_00059.aspx.  Since Aug. 2001, Mr. 
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example, the Whitney Museum of American Art has twenty-seven members on 
its board of trustees.116  Twenty of these members serve on one or more 
boards.117  Robert J. Hurst, a Whitney trustee, is a partner of Crestview 
Partners, L.P., a private equity firm specialized in contrarian investments.118  
Hurst serves on eleven additional boards, including five for-profit boards: VF 
Corp., AirClic, Inc., Goldman, Sachs & Co., the Edgewater Funds, and Paris 
Re Holdings, Ltd., and six nonprofit organizations: NYC 2012, Inc., a 
nonprofit which promoted New York City to host the 2012 Olympics, The 
Jewish Museum, 9/11 United Services Group, the National Gallery of Art, the 
Aspen Institute, and the Central Park Conservancy.119  When nonprofits are 
fortunate enough to attract directors with for-profit experience, there is a 
noteworthy benefit.  Because of his exposure to corporate practices and 
policies, Mr. Hurst will bring his experiences and knowledge base into each 
board meeting—whether it be for-profit or nonprofit—as will many other 
board members who hold board positions in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors 
simultaneously. 
Directors may have different motivations for serving on nonprofit boards, 
which changes both how they view their role and the expectations that the 
 
Boston has been with Cisco Systems, Inc., and is currently serving as Cisco’s Senior Vice 
President and Chief Information Officer.  NetNumber, Brad Boston, Director of the Company, 
http://www.netnumber.com/about-us-brad-boston.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).  From June 
2000 to July 2001, Mr. Boston served as the Executive Vice President of Operations at Corio, an 
enterprise-focused Internet application service provider.  Freebase, Brad Boston, http://www.free 
base.com/view/en/brad_boston (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).  From June 1996 to June 2000, Mr. 
Boston served as Executive Vice President of product development and delivery at the Sabre 
Group, a publicly traded travel-related products company.  Id.  He has also held executive 
positions at American Express, Visa, United Airlines/Covia, and at American National Bank and 
Trust Company of Chicago.  Cisco, Brad Boston, Senior Vice President, Global Government 
Solution and Corporate Security Programs, http://resources.cisco.com/servletwl3/FileDown 
loader/vamprod/379250/_Brad_Boston_bio.11.7.06.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).  Mr. Boston 
serves on the board of directors of Mercury Interactive Corporation, a publicly traded software 
solutions company.  Brad Boston, http://www.evanta.com/details_popup.php?cmd=speaker&id 
=15.  He also serves on the board of the American Red Cross USA.  Brad Boston, 
http://www.freebase.com/view/en/brad_boston (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).  Mr. Boston holds a 
B.S. in Computer Science from University of Illinois, College of Engineering, Champaign-
Urbana, Illinois. 
 116. Whitney Museum of American Art: Board of Directors Profile, BUS. WK., 
http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/private/board.asp?privcapId=43
76711 (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 117. See id. 
 118. Robert Hurst: Crestview Partners L.P. Executive Profile & Biography, BUS. WK., 
http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=51
0450&privcapId=20394693&previousCapId=4274402&previousTitle=National%20Gallery%20
Of%20Art (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 119. Whitney Museum of American Art, supra note 116. 
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organization has of them.120  This trend perpetuates “[t]he common folklore . . . 
that nonprofit board members should bring to [the] organization the three W’s 
[sic]: wealth (donations and fundraising), wisdom (monitoring and oversight), 
and work (operational duties).”121  Nonprofit board members are often selected 
for their wealth or their work.122  The last of the three Ws, wisdom, 
unfortunately appears to be the least sought-after attribute in the board member 
recruitment process.  These directors might have no prior governance or 
business experience.123  They are often community leaders with a passion for 
the organization’s mission.124  Nonprofit boards, generally larger than for-
profit boards, are challenged to recruit effective members in light of the long 
list of responsibilities, possible liability, time commitment, and the lack of 
resources available for training and support.125  The list of responsibilities of 
the nonprofit board is long and includes leading of strategic planning, 
determining the organization’s mission and purpose, designing and conducting 
program evaluations, grant writing, conducting executive staff and ED/CEO 
evaluations, interviewing important hires, attending community meetings, 
fundraising, drafting conflict of interest policies, conducting board training, 
speaking to the media, attending community, city, and statewide meetings to 
represent the organization, reviewing financial records, taking minutes of all 
meetings, opening mail, responding to inquiries of the board, providing 
guidance in all ethical and financial matters, drafting employee policies, and 
setting compensation.126 
There is often no compensation available for nonprofit directors and little 
available for reimbursement of commuting expenses or meals:127 “Only about 
2% of nonprofit board members receive an annual fee and about 4% receive a 
 
 120. See Katherine O’Regan & Sharon M. Oster, Does the Structure and Composition of the 
Board Matter? The Case of Nonprofit Organizations, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 207–08 (2005). 
 121. Id. at 207. 
 122. Nonprofits are interested in acquiring unrestricted funding.  See id. at 208 (noting that 
board directors on nonprofit boards favor a board full of individuals who are willing and able to 
donate money without restrictions).  Traditional funders, foundations, governments, and, to some 
extent, corporations often earmark funds for direct program services.  This leaves little funding 
available to supplement programs or for capacity building. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See O’Regan & Oster, supra note 120, at 206 (stating that nonprofit boards are generally 
larger). 
 126. Id. at 207 (“But the particulars of what the directors should be doing are more 
complicated for the nonprofit.”). 
 127. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
206 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:187 
per-meeting fee,” unusual outside of large and complex nonprofit 
organizations.128 
Charles Prince, CEO of Citigroup and a member of Juilliard School’s 
board, said that “nonprofits carry ‘even more of a burden of 
responsibility’ . . . . ‘They don’t have the check and balance of shareholder 
activists showing up at annual meetings to point out problems.’”129  A recent 
study by Professor Judith L. Miller found that nonprofit board members 
struggled to identify any persons or groups to whom they were accountable.130  
This lack of accountability, including lack of accountability to shareholders, 
forces nonprofit boards to explain their conduct to a broad range of parties with 
competing agendas, such as donors, governmental authorities, clients, and staff 
members.131  These competing interests often push nonprofit board members to 
pursue differing goals in their board responsibilities.132  When nonprofits 
accommodate these interests, it can be difficult for them to articulate and strive 
toward a coherent mission.133 
The adversities faced by nonprofit board members undermine power and 
independence in the boardroom.  Professor Judith Miller has “found that 
nonprofit board members rubberstamp management’s proposals without 
[evaluating] the effect those proposals would have on the organization.”134  
She further noted that “boards frequently defer[red] to staff and the chief 
executive officer,” even when circumstances appeared to mandate a more 
diligent oversight regime.135  In a recent study, Professor Edward Glaeser 
confirmed Miller’s findings that nonprofit organizations are often captured by 
their staff and tend to evolve towards “worker cooperatives,” especially as the 
net worth of the organization increases.136  Other empirical studies also 
corrborate that “[l]arge or small . . . most voluntary agencies are unusually 
 
 128. Maureen Glabman, The Future of Voluntary Governance, HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, 
Sept. 2006, at 68. 
 129. Carol Hymowitz, In Sarbanes-Oxley Era, Running a Nonprofit Is Only Getting Harder, 
WALL ST. J., June 21, 2005, at B1. 
 130. Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose Is Not Good for the Gander: Sarbanes-
Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 1986 (2007) (citing Judith L. Miller, 
The Board as a Monitor of Organizational Activity: The Applicability of Agency Theory to 
Nonprofit Boards, 12 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 429, 439–42 (2002) [hereinafter Board 
as Monitor]). 
 131. Miller, Board as a Monitor, supra note 130, at 442. 
 132. Mulligan, supra note 130, at 1986. 
 133. Id. at 1986 (citing O’Regan & Oster, supra note 121, at 205–06). 
 134. Miller, Board as a Monitor, supra note 130, at 438. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Edward L. Glaeser, Introduction, in THE GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS 1, 36 (Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2003). 
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dependent on the quality of their executive leadership and, therefore, more 
subject to idiosyncratic rather than structural factors.”137 
In spite of similar duties and legal obligations, nonprofit and for-profit 
boards operate differently.  Nonprofit board members are often unable to pay 
sufficient attention to the materials and lack the knowledge to manage, 
monitor, or exercise independence.138  As imagined, the majority of nonprofit 
boards are disadvantaged in terms of resources, finances, and talent.139  The 
significant differences between the resources available to nonprofit boards and 
for-profit boards should not be glossed over.  The deficits in terms of 
resources, training, experience, and support in the nonprofit arena can leave a 
nonprofit management environment vulnerable and unable to detect or remedy 
programmatic and fiscal problems.  Nonprofits with weak governance are most 
susceptible to fraud and other types of mismanagement.  These disadvantages 
for nonprofit boards will not be addressed by further regulation involving 
additional disclosures. 
C. Nonprofit Regulation in a Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley World 
The lack of regulation is not the biggest problem facing nonprofits.  
Nonprofits are regulated by state laws, the IRS, and informally by donors 
through their ability to walk away and leave the nonprofit without sufficient 
funding.  Donors can obtain information about nonprofits from IRS Form 
990.140  Most 501(c)(3) charities file IRS Form 990 annually with the IRS.141  
Information from Form 990 can be used by donors to assist in deciding where 
to contribute their funds and time.142  In the past, nonprofits did not have to 
provide the public with Form 990 unless the request was made in person at the 
nonprofit’s office.143  But currently, “regulations require that a 501(c) 
organization make copies of its three most recent Forms 990 for anyone who 
requests them, whether in person or by mail, fax, or e-mail.”144  Since July 
1998, the IRS has scanned and posted Forms 990 on the Internet as it receives 
 
 137. Ralph M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies and the Personal Social Services, in THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR 240, 244 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987). 
 138. See O’Regan & Oster, supra note 120, at 208 (noting the difficulty with “meddling” 
board members among nonprofits). 
 139. See supra notes 120–26. 
 140. I.R.S., THE NEW FORM 990: WHAT TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS NEED TO KNOW, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4741.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 141. Quality 990, About Form 990, http://www.qual990.org/value_of_990.html (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2010). 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
208 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:187 
them.145  In 1999, the California Attorney General created a website where 
users can search for information concerning nonprofit organizations.146  
Though it does not provide access to informational forms filed by charities, 
such as Forms 990, it does link to the Guidestar website where those items can 
be searched.147  The approximately 350,000 religious congregations are 
considered public charities, but are not required to register with the IRS.148  
Religious organizations are exempt from filing Form 990.149  They remain 
exempt, even though they have significant financial assets.  In 2006 alone, 
religious institutions received $96.82 billion in donations150 and $2.2 billion in 
federal grants to provide social services.151  But religious organizations are not 
inherently less likely to engage in poor decision-making or wrongdoing.  
Bearing this in mind, along with considerable assets so many nonprofits 
maintain, all nonprofits with revenues in excess of $25,000 should now be 
required to file Form 990 with the IRS. 
Individual states have always had the first line of responsibility for 
regulating nonprofit organizations.  And, to this day, state regulations vary 
considerably.152  But generally, state laws tend to uniformly cover a nonprofit’s 
ability to conduct ethical business through contract, consumer protection, and 
fundraising laws.153  States regulate nonprofits most often through the State 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Charities: Filings and Searches, http://ag.ca.gov/charities/ 
index.php (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); GuideStar, Nonprofit Reports and Forms 990 for Donors, 
Granmakers, and Businesses, http://www2.guidestar.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 147. Cal. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 146; GuideStar, supra note 146. 
 148. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 139. 
 149. I.R.S., Filing Requirements—Exempt Organizations, http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/ 
0,,id=96103,00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 150. Jeffrey Thomas, Charitable Donations by Americans Reach Record High, USINFO, 
June 26, 2007, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/June/200706261522251CJsamo 
hT0.8012354.html. 
 151. The White House, Fact Sheet: The Faith-Based and Community Initiative: A Quiet 
Revolution in the Way Government Addresses Human Need (2008), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080129-8.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 152. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL 
AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 53–54, 306 (2004); NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE 
FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN NONPROFIT SECTOR 20–23 (2001).  See 
also Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613, 618 (2005) 
(noting that nonprofit law at the federal level traditionally focused on “issues directly connected 
with taxation” while state law focused on issues of “fiduciary duties and governance principles”).  
Over time there has been an “extension of federal supervision into areas . . . for which the states 
have been principally responsible.”  Id. 
 153. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 152, at 476–95; Seth Perlman, Advising Nonprofit 
Organizations 2009, State and Federal Regulation of Charitable Solicitations, 182 PLI/NY 355 
(2004). 
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Attorney General’s Office.154  Most have strong public policy interests in 
safeguarding the funds of nonprofits because states often support nonprofits 
through licensing and funding in the form of grants and forgone tax revenue on 
charitable contributions to nonprofits. 
Between the 1940s and the 1960s, several states passed legislation 
requiring registration and reporting of charities in an effort to enhance the 
power of the state attorneys general.155  But it has long been demonstrated that 
state attorney general offices have neither the person-power, nor the will, to 
monitor nonprofits effectively.156  For example, in 2002, the New York State 
Attorney General’s Charities Bureau had six accountants to oversee 40,000 
charities and was primarily responsible for helping charities comply with state 
requirements rather than aggressively policing them.157  At that time, the 
Bureau relied on information kept on three-by-five-inch index cards to track 
the organizations—requests for the money to computerize the operation had 
been repeatedly rejected.158  In the words of Professor Harvey Dale, a long-
time observer of the nonprofit world: 
[G]overnment regulators (and most particularly attorneys general, to whom the 
law confides the principal role in policing charities) tend to allocate their 
scarce regulatory resources to other more politically potent portions of their 
domains.  In most states, the Charity Bureau of the Attorney General is 
inactive, ineffective, overwhelmed, or some combination of these.159 
The oversight by state attorneys general has been generally ineffective.  But 
the attorneys general in sixteen “key” states160 supervise charities in a way that 
manages to positively impact their compliance with the laws.161  These sixteen 
states are key states because they contain 57% of all public charities.162  In 
 
 154. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 152, at 301. 
 155. Some states do earmark charity registration fees for oversight and enforcement functions.  
See, e.g., 44 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/19 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 128.670(9) (2007). 
 156. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 221–28 (1965) 
(discussing tax inadequacies and the legislative attempts to solve them); Peter Swords, Nonprofit 
Accountability: The Sector’s Response to Government Regulation, 25 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 
413 (1999). 
 157. Nina Bernstein, Officials Overlooked Dire Signs at Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at 
B1. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Swords, supra note 156, at 413. 
 160. California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and 
Texas.  DAVID BIESMESDERFER & ANDRAS KOSARAS, THE VALUE OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
STATE CHARITY REGULATORS & PHILANTHROPISTS 4 (2006), available at http://www.giving 
forum.org.policy/regulators.html or http:/www.cof.org. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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most of these sixteen key states, there is no funding earmarked for charitable 
oversight and enforcement, and in spite of this, the states still perform well in 
the area of regulation.163 
There have been several instances of vigorous and successful prosecutions 
of nonprofits by states’ attorneys general as well as various U.S. Attorney 
Generals.  New York’s Attorney General investigated the misuse of the funds 
by Hale House, a nonprofit founded to care for homeless infants and 
toddlers.164  The investigation resulted in the installation of an interim board of 
directors.165  Furthermore, in agreement with prosecutors, former President Dr. 
Lorraine Hale pleaded guilty to a single larceny charge, and her husband, Jesse 
DeVore, pleaded guilty to a fraud charge.  The husband and wife each received 
five years probation and are paying restitution.166 
In 2002, the U.S. Attorney General prosecuted the former chief executive 
of the United Way of the National Capital Area after the media revealed that 
the organization misappropriated $1.6 million.  An audit revealed personal 
purchases on the corporate credit card and other financial mismanagements.167  
As a result, the chief executive was sentenced to twenty-seven months in jail 
and faced civil lawsuits.168  In 2002, the Easter Seals Iowa chapter fired its 
former president, who subsequently pleaded guilty to two theft charges, 
resulting in a loss of $230,000 to the organization.169  The misappropriation 
was revealed in an audit, and the former president received three-years 
probation.170 
Additionally, in 2005, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of 
California indicted forty-nine people, alleging a scheme to misappropriate 
money intended for Hurricane Katrina relief victims.171  The U.S. Attorney 
sought restitution.172 
 
 163. There is information available about states which earmark charity registration fees for 
oversight and enforcement functions.  Id. at 4. 
 164. Scandal at Hale House, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2001, at WK16. 
 165. Joseph P. Fried, For Hale House Couple, A Struggle After the Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2003, at N37. 
 166. Id. 
 167. United Way of the National Capital Area Rebuilds Reputation, PHILANTHROPY NEWS 
DIG., Sept. 30, 2003, http://foundationcenter.org/pnd/news/story.jhtml?id=44600002 (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2010). 
 168. Brad Wolverton, D.C. United Way Leader Sentenced to Jail Time, CHRON. OF 
PHILANTHROPY, May 17, 2004, http://philanthropy.com/free/update/2004/05/2004051701.htm. 
 169. Elizabeth Stanton, National Briefing, Midwest: Iowa: Charity Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
9, 2002, at A20. 
 170. Former Easter Seals Executive in Iowa Gets Probation for Stealing from Charity, 
ASSOC. PRESS, June 20, 2002, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-53751495.html. 
 171. Dozens Indicted in Alleged Katrina Scam, Dec. 29, 2005, CNN.COM, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/12/28/katrina.fraud/index.html. 
 172. Id. 
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As the foregoing demonstrates, prosecutions of nonprofits for financial 
mistakes do occur and are a real concern for nonprofits and their boards.  Once 
a state regulator decides to prosecute a nonprofit, it typically seeks remedies 
such as restitution, imposition of fines, removal of directors and executives, 
and, in some instances, dissolution of the charity.173 
Though state attorneys general historically have been responsible for 
charities’ accountability, because of a lack of resources, the IRS has also 
become the primary regulator of nonprofit behavior.174  The IRS regulates 
nonprofits through its ability to grant or withhold nonprofit status to 
organizations.  Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code requires that 
nonprofits seeking charitable status meet certain requirements and refrain from 
certain activity.175 
II.  THE RISE OF SARBANES-OXLEY 
In 2002, the federal government adopted Sarbanes-Oxley in response to 
public concern over highly publicized, fraudulent activity by public 
corporations.176  Such notable debacles include Enron, Tyco, Adelphia, 
WorldCom, and HealthSouth.177  As a response, Sarbanes-Oxley seeks to 
facilitate sound governance and fiscal transparency through accurate disclosure 
and processes in publicly-traded corporations.178  It requires corporations to 
disclose whether or not—and if not, the reason therefore—an issuer has 
adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers, its principal financial 
officer, comptroller or principal accounting officer, or any persons performing 
similar functions.179  Such a code of ethics should articulate standards to 
protect the corporation from conflicts of interest.180  It also requires the 
corporation to create an internal structure to ensure material accuracy of 
 
 173. BIESMESDERFER & KOSARAS, supra note 160, at 2. 
 174. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., S. REP. NO. GAO-02-526, at 26 (2002), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02526.pdf. 
 175. Prohibited activity includes the use of earnings to benefit a private individual.  26 I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 176. Paula J. Dalley, Public Company Corporate Governance Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 185, 185 (2003). 
 177. Penelope Patsurius, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES (2002), http://www.forbes. 
com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html. 
 178. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006) In addition to Sarbanes Oxley, 
publicly traded corporations are regulated and examined by a number of bodies including the 
Internal Revenue Service, the Exchanges, the threat of Shareholder suits, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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financial reports, provide protections for whistle-blowers, and establish rules of 
conduct for lawyers.181 
There is little doubt that Sarbanes-Oxley is the most important piece of 
legislation in the area of corporations since the adoption of the federal 
securities laws in the 1930s.182  Sarbanes-Oxley has become synonymous with 
the phrases “good corporate governance” and “best practices.”183  The 
mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley have been enhanced through rules implemented 
by stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange and the 
Nasdaq.184  The explicit and the implicit reforms attributable to Sarbanes-
Oxley will collectively be referred to as “Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms” herein. 
Corporations, attorneys, and accountants have made great strides in their 
individual arenas to meet the varied demands of Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms.185  
But critics have come from every corner and hit upon all facets of Sarbanes-
 
 181. E. William Bates, II & Elizabeth M. Schubert, Sarbanes-Oxley Act Less Applicable to 
Not-for-Profits, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 29, 2003. 
 182. See Steven R. Harmon et. al., Morgan, Miller, Blair, Historic Redesign of Securities Law 
Should Be of Interest to All, Aug. 30, 2002, http://www.mmblaw.com/newsevents.php?News 
ID=34; The Compliance Partners, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, http://www.thecompliancepartners.com/ 
klmbill.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Allison Fass, One Year Later, The Impact of Sarbanes-
Oxley, FORBES.COM, July 22, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/22/cz_af_0722 
sarbanes.html. 
 183. Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002: Goals, Content, and Status of Implementation, Video Address at the 
International Financial Law Review European Awards, (Mar. 25, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch032503psa.htm; Robert Rinninsland, Understanding the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, BNA TAX & ACCOUNTING, Feb. 13, 2002, http://www.fdta-
cite.org/articles/ox.htm; Larry Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing 
Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 351–54, 363 (2004); 
Susi H. Willis, Best Practices: the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Good Governance for All Entities, IND. 
BUS. MAG., Nov. 2005, at 63. 
 184. One such enhancement is the New York Stock Exchanges’ imposition of the definition 
and requirement to have independent directors on the board or directors.  See Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745 (Nov. 4, 2003). 
 185. Thomas Hoffman, IT Managers Brace to Meet Ongoing Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance 
Demands, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 2, 2004, http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/ 
government/policy/story/0,10801,94956,00.html; PricewaterhouseCoopers, Complying with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, http://www.pwc.com/extweb/industry.nsf/docid/743696FEA3F3D3D385257 
0140078BB42 (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Upside Software Inc., Contract Management Helps 
Meet Sarbanes-Oxley Act Requirements (Oct. 2004), http://www.upsidesoft.com/Upside+Soft 
ware/PDF/BP%20SOX%20FINAL%20101804.pdf; Pat Broderick, Attorneys Help Firms Avoid 
Corporate Fraud: Landscape After Enron Offers Plenty of Opportunity, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., May 
29, 2006, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5247/is_22_27/ai_n29272838?tag= 
content;col1; IBM Corp., Accelerating Your Response to Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation (2004), 
ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/software/lotus/lotusweb/workplace/businessControlReporting/ISSLSO
X.pdf. 
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Oxley Reforms.186  Various lawyers, firms, and representative associations 
complained that Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms may adversely impact the attorney–
client relationship; accountants complained, among other things, that the 
attempts toward auditor independence would not be successful, and 
prohibitions against consulting and auditing services were unnecessary; small 
businesses and representative groups complained that the cost of compliance 
would be enormous; CEOs complained about the complexity and distraction 
caused by the Act; and others complained that the requirements of the Act will 
threaten competitiveness.187  Critics feared small company delistings, fewer 
Initial Public Offerings (“IPOs”), and reduced profit margins due to the 
compliance costs associated with Sarbanes-Oxley.188 
In the six years that have passed since enactment, the fears and doubts 
about Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms’ impact on capital formation have subsided.  
With respect to IPOs, in 2007, there were 296 IPOs raising $65.1 billion; in 
2006, there were 236 IPOs raising $50 billion; in 2005, there were 221 IPOs 
raising $39 billion; in 2004, there were 260 IPOs raising $51.9 billion; and 
prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, in 2003, there were 88 IPOs raising $18.6 billion.189  
A high percentage of venture or financial-sponsor-backed IPOs helped to 
increase IPO activity.  Complaints that compliance is a distraction have been 
abandoned as the view that corporate responsibility should be and ongoing 
focus of management has gained favor. 
 
 186. See Laura Rich, Sarbanes-Oxley Draws Renewed Criticism, INC.: THE DAILY RESOURCE 
FOR ENTREPRENEURS, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.inc.com/news/articles/200501/sarbox.html; 
Joseph T. Lonsdale, Sarbanes-Oxley Act Draws Criticism, (Sept. 2002), http://securities.stanford. 
edu/news-archive/2002/20020920_Headline08_Lonsdale.htm; Cheryl L. Wade, Sarbanes-Oxley 
Five Years Later: Will Criticism of SOX Undermine Its Benefits?, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 595, 595–
96 (2008).  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Comments on Proposed Rule: Revision of 
the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s71300.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 187. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 186. 
 188. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., S. REP. NO. GAO-06-361, at 7 (2006), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06361.pdf; Paul Arnold, Give Them a Choice: Solving Sarbanes-
Oxley Section 404 Inefficiency with Optional Compliance, available at http://works.bepress.com/ 
paul_arnold/2/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 189. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2007 US IPO WATCH: ANALYSIS AND TRENDS 6 (2008), 
available at http://www.altassets.com/pdfs/pwc_2007_us_ipo__watch.pdf; PRICEWATERHOUSE 
COOPERS, US IPO WATCH: 2006 ANALYSIS AND TREND 1–2 (2007), available at 
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/23CFAAFB69354CBD852572BA007A2
1AA/$File/2006analysis_usipowatch.pdf; US Recorded Largest Number of IPOs in 2004 Since 
Internet Bubble, ALTASSETS, Mar. 01, 2005, http://www.altassets.com/news/arc/2005/nz 
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Sarbanes-Oxley covers a broad range of reform.190  While Sarbanes-Oxley 
is applicable to only a small fraction of business enterprises, it has had a ripple 
effect throughout the economy.191  Small businesses, nonreporting entities, 
large nonprofits, and organizations doing business with reporting companies 
have proactively adopted many Sarbanes-Oxley-like measures.192  The 
voluntary adoption of these measures has been referred to as “creep.”193  Creep 
is the voluntary adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley practices as well as the gratuitous 
introduction and application of Sarbanes-Oxley practices.194 
The reforms mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley in the areas of Auditor 
Independence, Corporate Responsibility, and Financial Disclosure are most 
applicable to the nonprofit sector.  These changes will be discussed in this 
section of the Article. 
A. Auditor Independence 
Sarbanes-Oxley restrains registered public accounting firms engaged in an 
audit for a public-company client from providing certain nonauditing services, 
including, but not limited to, bookkeeping, appraisals or valuation services, 
human resources functions, broker–dealer or actuarial investments advisory 
services, legal or expert services, and any other investment services.195  The 
board must preapprove all auditing services and non-auditing services outside 
of the enumerated list.196  The lead auditing partner must change at least every 
 
 190. The titles of Sarbanes-Oxley are:  Title 1, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; 
Title II, Auditor Independence; Title III, Corporate Responsibility; Title IV, Enhanced Financial 
Disclosures; Title V, Analysis Conflicts of Interest; Title VI, SEC Resources and Authority; Title 
VII, Studies and Reports; Title VIII, Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability; Title IX, 
White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements; Title X, Corporate Tax Returns; Title XI, Corporate 
Fraud Accountability. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006). 
 191. See PAUL D. BROUDE ET AL., NAT’L DIRECTORS INST., THE IMPACT OF SARBANES-
OXLEY ON PRIVATE & NONPROFIT COMPANIES, 1, 2 (2005), available at http://www.directors 
andboards.com/ndi.pdf. 
 192. See Gerald L. Blanchard, A Troubled Recipe for Nonprofits: Equal Parts Congress 
Sarbanes-Oxley, U.S. Treasury Department, the IRS, and Bankruptcy, THE RISK MGMT. ASS’N J., 
March 2007, at 59, 65. 
 193. Greg Baldwin et al., “Compliance Creep”: The Ever Expanding World of Compliance, 
Financial Services Technology, http://www.usfst.com/currentissue/article.asp?art=272053& 
issue=228 (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
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their general auditing practices to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley and then apply these processes to 
all auditing clients regardless of their reporting status.  See Blanchard, supra note 192, at 59, 65. 
 195. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745, 771–72 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 
15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
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five years, and, in addition, the auditor is required to report to the audit 
committee, which must be comprised of independent directors.197 
B. Corporate Responsibility 
Many companies have their own view of corporate responsibility.198  
Corporate responsibility involves a company incorporating economic, 
environmental, and social impacts into their business decisions as well as 
following regulations and procedural guidelines.199  The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission is required to instruct the securities exchanges to 
prevent the listing of corporations that do not meet certain requirements.200  
Officers of periodic reporting companies are required to certify that they have 
reviewed such filings and, based on their knowledge, that the report does not 
contain an untrue statement of material fact or omit a material fact necessary to 
make the statement not misleading.201  Further, the officer must certify that the 
financial statement in the filings fairly represents the true financial condition of 
the company.202  The signing officer is also required to certify his or her 
responsibility for establishing and maintaining internal controls, and to have 
designed, evaluated, and presented conclusions in the report about internal 
controls to ensure that material information relating to the issuer and its 
consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such officer by others within those 
entities.203 
 
 197. Id. at 773. 
 198. See Walt Disney Company, Corporate Responsibility, http://corporate.disney.go.com/ 
corporate/corporate_responsibility.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Merck, Corporate 
Responsibility, http://www.merck.com/corporate-responsibility/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Intel, 
Corporate Responsibility, http://www.intel.com/intel/corpresponsibility/index.htm (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2010); Starbucks, Corporate Social Responsibility, http://www.starbucks.com/aboutus/ 
csr.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 199. See Mallen Baker, Definitions of Corporate Social Responsibility, http://www.mallen 
baker.net/csr/CSRfiles/definition.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Maggi Hill, Corporate Social 
Responsibility—The Responsible Thing to Do, MERCER BUS., May 1, 2007, http://find 
articles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3697/is_200705/ai_n19433654?tag=content;col1. 
 200. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 
18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 201. Id. at 777.  Periodic reports, both 10-Ks and 10-Qs, are required by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.  Id. at 776.  Reporting companies are defined as those with more than $10 
million in assets and whose securities are held by more than 500 owners.  These companies need 
to file annual and other periodic reports.  MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 209 (9th ed. 2005). 
 202. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745, 777. 
 203. Id. 
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1. Director Independence 
While guidelines about Director Independence do not appear in the Act 
itself, they are required by the Stock Exchanges and are considered a part of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms.204  Each exchange has its own rules.  The rules may 
vary slightly, but are consistent on most material matters.  Under the NYSE’s 
rules, a director is considered independent if he or she does not have a material 
relationship with the listed company.205  An affirmative finding of 
independence must be made by the board, and any conflicts must be deemed 
immaterial.206 The independence determination must be disclosed to 
shareholders in a proxy statement.207  Employment, affiliation, or 
compensation over the past three years might prevent a director from being 
independent for board purposes.208 
2. Committee Requirements 
Stock Exchange listed company committees engaged in governance, 
director selection, compensation, and auditing functions, must be comprised 
exclusively of independent directors.209  These committees must also have 
publicly available charters which articulate the purpose and responsibility of 
each committee.210 
3. Governance guidelines 
Listed companies must also develop and adopt certain governance 
guidelines and make these available to the public.211  The governance 
guidelines must cover a broad range of specific topics, including but not 
limited to, director education, training, qualifications, responsibility, 
management succession, and an annual self-evaluation report.212 
4. Code of ethics 
Stock Exchange listed companies must also develop and adopt codes of 
ethics for its officers, directors, and employees.213  These codes must be 
available to the public and should cover conflicts of interest, use of company 
 
 204. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.00-01 (2009), http://nysemanual. 
nyse.com; NASDAQ, Inc., NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, R. IM-5605 (2009), http://nasdaq. 
cchwallstreet.com/. 
 205. Listed Company Manual § 303A.02(a). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. § 303A.02(b)(i). 
 209. Id. §§ 303A.02, 303A.04, 303A.05, 303A.07. 
 210. Listed Company Manual, supra note 204, §§ 303A.02, 303A.04, 303A.05, 303A.07. 
 211. Id. § 303A.09; NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 204, at R. 5250(b)(1). 
 212. Listed Company Manual § 303A.09; NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, R. 5601. 
 213. Listed Company Manual § 303A.09; NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, R. IM-5610. 
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assets, and contain language encouraging the reporting of any illegal or 
unethical activity.214 
C. Enhanced Financial Disclosures 
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that reporting companies disclose matters having 
a significant impact of the company’s financial statement; prohibits personal 
loans to directors or executives; and requires reporting of insider activities by 
directors, executives, and shareholders with more than 10% of any class of 
shares.215  Under Sarbanes-Oxley, each reporting company must file its ethics 
code for senior financial officers and a management assessment of internal 
controls.216  Reporting companies must disclose whether the audit committee 
has a financial expert.217  As a response to corporate scandals, it is possible that 
Sarbanes-Oxley has bolstered investor confidence in the markets.218  It has 
been suggested that similar regulations can be the answer to an embattled 
nonprofit sector. 
III.  NONPROFITS SCANDALS AND REGULATORY RESPONSES 
Nonprofit malfeasance did not historically generate the amount of public 
outcry associated with the recent Enron scandal.  Perhaps there is a direct 
relationship between public outrage to management malfeasance and 
individual harm.  In the Enron case, individuals were injured, there were 
layoffs, job losses, and millions in retirement funds lost.219  These major losses 
affected not only the employees of Enron but the market as well.  It also 
sparked new discussion on ways to prevent this type of loss from happening 
ever again.220 
In contrast, nonprofit malfeasance does not result in donor harm.  The 
injury caused by nonprofit malfeasance is often to those individuals who rely 
on nonprofits for services through the reduction in quality programming and 
subsequent donations.  But the impact of nonprofit malfeasance may be 
detrimental to the role of a nonprofit’s ability to fundraise and carry out its 
 
 214. Listed Company Manual § 303A.10; NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, R. IM-5610. 
 215. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745, 785–88 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 
15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 216. Id. at 789. 
 217. Id. at 790. 
 218. Part of this confidence building is also related to Sarbanes-Oxley’s increased Corporate 
and Criminal Fraud Accountability found in Title VIII and the White-Collar Crime Penalty 
Enhancements found in Title IX.  See id. at 746. 
 219. Rick Bragg, Workers Feel Pain of Layoffs and Added Sting of Betrayal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
20, 2002, at A1. 
 220. Daniel Altman, The Pensions, Bush Promises a Look at Employee Risks, but Experts Say 
Solutions Won’t Be Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at C4. 
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mission.  As problems arose due to fraud by publicly-traded companies, the 
media and the public began to examine nonprofit corporations for similar 
behavior.  Nonprofits have operated with minimal scrutiny from the media and 
regulators because the dollar amounts at stake are minimal and regulatory 
resources are scarce. 
Even though donors, big and small, expect no return on their donations, 
and there are no shares, dividends, or proxy statements to watch for, nonprofits 
are still big businesses with a large economic impact.221  Evaluating nonprofits 
in terms of their size, revenue, employees, and expenditures reveals striking 
similarities to their for-profit counterparts. 
From 1995 to 2002, $1.28 billion was lost in nonprofit scandals.222  Among 
them were Nature Conservancy, a nonprofit which buys land for nature 
preserves (allegations of insider retail estate purchases from board members), 
Bishop Estate of Hawaii, a one-hundred-year-old trust, charged with educating 
the children of Hawaii (allegations of corruption involving state supreme court 
judges and many powerful elites), and the United Way of the National Capital 
Area223 (allegations of financial fraud).224 
 
 221. Numerous reports and studies have examined nonprofit sector economic impact and have 
concluded that in many communities the economic impact exceeds $1 Billion.  See, e.g., PUB. 
SECTOR CONSULTANTS, INC., ECONONOMIC BENEFITS OF MICHIGAN’S NONPROFIT SECTOR 
PARTS I & II (2004), available at http://www.publicsectorconsultants.com/Documents/mna 
/index.htm; LESTER M. SALAMON & STEPHANIE LESSANS GELLER, MAINE NONPROFIT 
EMPLOYMENT (2003), available at http://www.nonprofitmaine.org/documents/Employment 
Study.pdf; CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV. ET AL., INDIANA NONPROFIT EMPLOYMENT 
(2005), available at http://www.indiana.edu/~nonprof/results/inemploy/indianaempl05.pdf; UNIV. 
OF N.M. BUREAU OF BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH ET AL., ECONONOMIC IMPACT OF NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS IN NEW MEXICO (2006), available at http://www.nmag.org/files/nmag 
images/EconomicImpactofNMNonprofits.pdf; IOWA WORKFORCE DEV., IMPACT OF 
CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS ON IOWA’S ECONOMY & QUALITY OF LIFE 4, 6–17 
(2007), available at http://www.iowalifechanging.com/downloads/char_giving_report_FINAL-
02-01-2007.pdf; DADE CNTY. FOUND., SECTOR OF IMPACT II: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
NONPROFITS IN MIAMI-DADE COUNTY 2, 5–6 (2006), available at http://www.dadecommunity 
foundation.org/Site/docs/2006%20Sector%20of%20Impact.pdf. 
 222. Brad Wolverton, Study: Charity Fraud Exceeds $1-Billion, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, 
Nov. 27, 2003; see also Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers 
and Directors of Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995–2000 (Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit 
Org., Working Paper No. 20, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=451240. 
 223. Peter Whoriskey & Jacqueline L. Salmon, Charity Concealed Pilfering: Auditors Had 
Flagged United Way Ex-Chief, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Aug. 17, 2003, at A7 [hereinafter 
Charity Concealed Pilfering]. 
 224. Allegheny Health is another example of financial fraud that stemmed from 
misappropriation of funds by its CEO, including comingling of funds, which led to one of the 
largest bankruptcies among nonprofit companies.  See Lawton R. Burns et al., The Fall of the 
House of AHERF: The Allegheny Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2000, at 7, 10; Lisa 
Goldstein, The Failure of AHERF: 5 Important Lessons, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Aug. 2008, 
at 52, 52. 
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Such high-profile scandals draw the attention of lawmakers and donors to 
the functioning of nonprofit boards and the role of directors.  In addition to 
financial losses, nonprofit fraud and mismanagement can cause the erosion of 
donor confidence.225  After the United Way scandal, donations dropped from 
$45 million to $18 million.226 
It is apparent that the market conditions, criminality, irresponsibility, and 
mismanagement that led to the sweeping reforms implemented through 
Sarbanes-Oxley exist in the nonprofit sector.  But Sarbanes-Oxley does not 
extend to nonprofit corporations.227  Enhanced media and public scrutiny raises 
awareness for the necessity of the nonprofit boards to comply with corporate 
formalities and to follow their legal duties.228  Similar to Sarbanes-Oxley, 
regulation will make it easier for nonprofits to rebuild the trust of its donors. 
But the adoption and application of Sarbanes-Oxley-like regulation must 
be carefully considered in terms of its broad applicability to the nonprofit 
sector.  Only the largest for-profit corporations are governed by Sarbanes-
Oxley.  Perhaps it is inappropriate, in terms of cost–benefit, for smaller 
organizations to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley-like regulations. 
A. Nonprofit Regulation in a Post Sarbanes-Oxley World 
Sarbanes-Oxley is a high-water mark for the regulation of corporations and 
is the backdrop for the consideration of nonprofit regulatory reform.  
Commentators suggest that states should adopt Sarbanes-Oxley-like provisions 
in the area of nonprofit governance to stem the tide of scandals and bolster 
contributors’ confidence in the sector.  Some notable efforts toward state 
regulation of the nonprofit sector have already commenced.  Legislators in 
California, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas have introduced measures to 
increase state regulation over nonprofit organizations (“baby SOX”). 
After Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley, “the New York Legislature led the 
way by taking up a wide-ranging bill, championed by the state attorney general 
that would mandate Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms for the nonprofit sector.”229  
In January 2003, then-New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer began a 
charge to apply Sarbanes-Oxley-type accounting disclosure provisions to the 
 
 225. Whoriskey & Salmon, supra note 223, at A7. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Bates, II & Schubert, supra note 181, at 1. 
 228. JOHN P. VAIL & JOSHUA J. MINTZ, GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
IN 2003, at 1–2 (2003). 
 229. Mulligan, supra note 130, at 1983; S.B. 4836-A, 2003 Leg., 226th Gen. Sess. (N.Y. 
2003).  This bill was substantially amended. S.B. 4836-B, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. (N.Y. 2003).  
The legislature has yet to pass this bill.  See Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law: The 
Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
559, 562–64 (2005) (outlining the legislative history of the New York bill). 
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state’s nonprofit organizations.230  Spitzer sought to strengthen state laws “to 
protect donors.”231  After Spitzer’s interest, other states, including 
Massachusetts and California, attempted to introduce Sarbanes-Oxley-like 
provisions applicable to nonprofits.  California was the first state to enact these 
Sarbanes-Oxley-styled regulations.  The California Integrity Act of 2004 
enhances disclosures required of nonprofits operating in California.232  
Massachusetts introduced a similar bill: 
The Massachusetts attorney general . . . proposed his own bill similar to New 
York’s.  Neither bill passed.  Numerous other states have followed suit by 
introducing comparable Sarbanes-Oxley-like bills that ultimately failed to pass.  
Several states, however, have passed acts codifying some Sarbanes-Oxley-like 
reforms for nonprofit organizations, California’s Nonprofit Integrity Act of 
2004 being, perhaps, the most well-known.233 
In 2004 the Texas State Board of Accounting recommended to the governor, 
lieutenant governor, and speaker of the House that Texas not adopt additional 
layers of regulations for nonprofits.234  The board believed that standards 
should be developed nationally, but did not believe that SOX-like legislation 
was needed for officers and directors.235  The effect of these various bills can 
be summarized as follows: 
The unifying theme of these Sarbanes-Oxley-inspired bills and actions is their 
reliance upon disclosure mechanisms (e.g., officer-certified financial 
 
 230. Jeff Jones, N.Y.’s Attorney General Seeking to Apply Sarbanes-Oxley Act, NONPROFIT 
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2003, at 1. 
 231. Id. 
 232. The Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586 (2004). 
 233. Id. (citing Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, An Act to Promote 
the Financial Integrity of Public Charities, http://classic.cof.org/files/Documents/Building%20 
Strong%20Ethical%20Foundations/Mass_AG.Act_to_promote_fin_integ_pub_charities.pdf, (last 
visited Jan 11, 2010) [hereinafter Mass. A.G. Proposal]; S.B. 1115, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 
2004); H.B. 514, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2004); H.B. 724, Adjourned Sess.  Of 2003-2004 
Biennium (Vt. 2004); S.B. 153, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003); H.B. 1019, 187th 
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003)).  The U.S. Senate, spearheaded by Senator Grassley, has also 
considered Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit legislation, which is beyond the scope of this Article.  
See CARE Act of 2003, S.B. 476, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, 
Strengthening Transparency Governance Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Final 
Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector (2005), http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel_ 
Final_Report.pdf (providing a sweeping series of federal reforms upon request of the Senate 
Finance Committee); see, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §17510.5 (West Supp. 2006); CAL. 
GOV’T. CODE §§12581-12599.7; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §21a-190b, c, f, h (West Supp. 2006); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §17-1763, 17-6002 (Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§5004 (Supp. 
2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §7:28III-a (Supp. 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 12-4-14 
(LexisNexis 2004) (applying only to recipients of state grants). 
 234. Karen Gantt et al., Sarbanes-Oxley, Accounting Scandals, and State Accountancy 
Boards: Red Versus Blue State Reactions, CPA J., Sept. 2007, at 18, 22. 
 235. Id. 
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statements), governance mandates (e.g., audit committees), executive 
compensation review and approval, whistleblower protection, and auditing 
requirements (e.g., independent audits performed by CPAs) to induce 
corporate integrity.236 
 In addition to attempts at increased state regulation, the post-Sarbanes-
Oxley era ushered in new proposals for nonprofit regulation from the Office of 
the Inspector General for Health and Human Services, the United States 
Sentencing Commission, and the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners.237  In 2003, the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) entered 
the realm of regulating nonprofits by promulgating rules for nonprofits 
receiving federal funds.  The GAO regulations focus on auditor 
independence,238 enforcing the idea that an organization should not be 
performing its own auditing and consulting services.239  Auditing companies 
should be separate and independent from their clients.240 
The flurry of proposed state legislation in California, Massachusetts, New 
York, and Texas, considering or requiring Sarbanes-Oxley-type disclosures by 
nonprofit organizations, gained the attention of the media as well as U.S. 
Senators.  In 2004, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing titled Charity 
Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good 
Charities.241  At the outset of the Hearing, Senator Max Baucus acknowledged 
the vital role the charities play in American Society.242  He noted the depth of 
assistance ranging from repairing national parks from fires in the west to the 
soup kitchens serving the elderly.243  Senators Baucus and Charles Grassley 
expressed concern over recent charitable scandals, insufficient transparency, 
and inflated salaries.244  Those giving testimony before the Committee 
discussed failed boards, mismanagement, industry reform, and reform as 
 
 236. Mulligan, supra note 130, at 1983 (citing Reiser, supra note 229, at 562–66, 568, 573 
(outlining the legislative history of the New York bill)); Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why 
Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
205, 208–09, 268 (2004)). 
 237. See Paula Desio, An Overview of the Organizational Guidelines, http://www.ussc.gov/ 
corp/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 238. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS § 1.01 (2003), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/govaud/yb2003.pdf. 
 239. Thomas A. McLaughlin, For-Profit Spillover: New Regulation of Independence, 
NONPROFIT TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, at 14. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good Charities: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Charity Oversight 
Hearing]. 
 242. Id. at 2 (opening statement of Hon. Max Baucus). 
 243. Id. at 2–3 (opening statement of Hon. Max Baucus). 
 244. Id. at 1–3. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
222 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:187 
applicable to small nonprofits.245  Following several hearings including 
testimony from the director of the IRS, state attorneys general, and leaders 
from the nonprofit world, some members of Congress sought increased 
disclosure from, and oversight of, nonprofits.246  Ultimately, in June 2006, the 
Committee passed a series of measures designed to address potential abuses in 
the nonprofit sector through increased penalties for political activities, 
overvaluation of donations, and top officials engaged in illegal financial 
transactions.247 
In 2004, the IRS committed to increasing its review of 501(c)(3) agencies’ 
activities.248  On June 22, 2004, Mark W. Everson, then-Commissioner of the 
IRS, testified before the Senate Finance Committee: 
I share your view that we must quickly and effectively act now.  If these 
abuses are left unchecked, I believe there is the risk that Americans not only 
will lose faith in and reduce support for charitable organizations, but that the 
integrity of our tax system also will be compromised.249 
The Commissioner continued, calling for laws forcing nonprofit organizations 
to disclose greater amounts of information: 
Disclosure is an important way for the IRS to identify participants in abusive 
transactions.  However, our disclosure scheme, which originally was 
developed to address the taxable sector, does not yet fit all tax-exempt 
participants because the method of reporting does not fit all tax-exempt entities 
well [since some entities do not have to report under the current scheme].250 
In addition to the 501(c)(3) status, the IRS requires that certain nonprofits 
complete and file the Form 990.251 
In response to the nonprofit scandals,252 including the United Way 
excessive compensation scandal, in 2005, the IRS adopted new regulations.253  
 
 245. Charity Oversight Hearing, supra note 241, at 108th Cong., 2, 7, 9–15, 29, 32–33, 42–58 
(2004). 
 246. Id. at 2; Robert A. Britton, Making Disclosure Regulation Work in the Nonprofit Sector, 
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 437, 444–48 (2008). 
 247. Harvy Lipman, Senate Committee Passes New Accountability Rules: Passage of Giving 
Incentives Now in Doubt, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June 29, 2006, available at 
http://philanthropy.com/free/update/2006/06/2006062901.htm. 
 248. Press Release, IRS, IRS Commissioner Testimony: Charitable Giving Problems and Best 
Practices (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-04-081.pdf. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. IRS, Filing Requirements: Exempt Organizations, http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,, 
id=96103,00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).  Religious institutions are not required to file the 
Form 990.  Id.  Donors and members of the public that support these organizations through 
contributions are therefore not able to readily determine how these funds are used. 
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These new regulations make executives and directors personally liable for 
excessive compensation.254  The IRS can also impose immediate sanctions on 
nonprofit leaders who provide excess benefits to board members or other 
control persons.255  Even more recently, the IRS has designed a new Form 990 
for nonprofits.256  This new form will focus on the internal workings of these 
organizations and make internal activities more visible to the public—achieved 
through the reporting of transactions between board members and officers and 
the nonprofit entity.257  These changes have substantially increased the IRS 
enforcement presence. 
B. The Voluntary Adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley-Like Measures in the 
Nonprofit Sector 
Reform often follows destabilizing events, as seen in response to corporate 
scandal.  But within a few years, following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
several large nonprofits, led by the healthcare sector and education companies, 
voluntarily adopted various Sarbanes-Oxley-type disclosure requirements as 
“best practices.”258  Many of these firms perceive benefits of preemptively 
adopting Sarbanes-Oxley-type policies in the face of the attention their 
industry received from Congress and the IRS.259  Attorney Gerald L. Blanchard 
argues: 
 
 252. GREENBERG TRAURIG, HOW TO BE A RESPONSIBLE NONPROFIT DIRECTOR: DO’S AND 
DON’TS: AVOIDING PUNISHMENT FOR GOOD DEEDS 1 (2005), http://www2.gtlaw.com/pub/ 
Alerts/2005/1002.pdf. 
 253. Id.; Press Release, ERI Economic Research Institute, New Rules from IRS: Executives 
and Board Members at Nonprofits Personally Liable for Excessive Compensation (Mar. 7, 2005), 
http://www.eri-nonprofit-salaries.com/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.Dsp_Release&Press 
ReleaseID=92 [hereinafter ERI Press Release]. 
 254. ERI Press Release, supra note 253. 
 255. 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2006). 
 256. Press Release, IRS, IRS Releases Final 2008 Form 990 for Tax-Exempt Organizations, 
Adjusts Filing Threshold to Provide Transition Relief (Dec. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=176722,00.html [hereinafter IRS Press Release]; Paul 
M. Torgerson & Claire H. Topp, United States: IRS Clarifies Policies on Nonprofit Compliance, 
MONDAQ.COM, Oct. 27, 2008, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=68618 [hereinafter 
Torgerson & Topp]. 
 257. IRS Press Release, supra note 253. 
 258. A. Nagorski, Sarbanes-Oxley Isn’t Just for Public Firms, INTERNAL AUDITOR, June 
2006, at 20, 20; see also Cinda Becker, Transparent Motives: UPMC Blazes Trail for Not-for-
Profits in Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 31, 2006, at 28, 28 
(discussing the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center’s preemptive Sarbanes-Oxley 
“compliance”). 
 259. See Becker, supra note 258, at 28. 
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For example, the nonprofit University of Pittsburgh Medical Center has taken 
steps to become SOX certified by its outside auditor.  The Fitch ratings service 
issued a report in 2005 called “Sarbanes-Oxley and Not-For-Profit Hospitals: 
Increased Transparency and Improved Accountability,” in which it encourages 
hospitals to adopt SOX standards for corporate governance and financial 
transparency.  Likewise, Moody’s has issued a special comment called 
“Governance of Not-for-Profit Healthcare Organizations,” in which it 
discusses how compliance with best corporate governance and financial 
accountability practices plays into the rating process for bonds.  Thus, the large 
nonprofit organizations like hospitals are beginning to adopt SOX-like controls 
and systems, even though they are not technically required to do so.  Ratings 
agencies, accounting firms, and the investment community are beginning to 
expect that nonprofits will move toward SOX compliance.260 
The perceived benefits of voluntarily adopting Sarbanes-Oxley-like 
policies include increased public confidence in both the individual nonprofit 
corporation and the nonprofit sector as a whole, as well as improved internal 
accountability among nonprofit directors.261  Some nonprofit directors believe 
the application of Sarbanes-Oxley-type disclosure requirements to nonprofit 
entities is inevitable and prefer to have the policies in place as a preemptive 
measure.262 
C. Sarbanes-Oxley as a Required Regulatory Scheme Should Be Restricted to 
the Largest Nonprofits 
Sarbanes-Oxley applies to the largest corporations, those publicly-traded 
and regulated by the SEC.263  Since 2004, these companies, representing more 
than 95% of the total U.S. market capitalization, have been subject to all of the 
new rules created by Sarbanes-Oxley.264  Large organizations can more easily 
invest in the infrastructure to achieve compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley than 
publicly-traded small and mid-size corporations.265  And they may need the 
regulation more than smaller organizations because large organizations are 
vulnerable to mismanagement due to their size as opposed to smaller 
 
 260. Blanchard, supra note 192, at 65. 
 261. See Becker, supra note 258, at 28. 
 262. See David Wren, Nonprofits Feel Pinch of Firmer Financial Rules, SUN NEWS, Nov. 13, 
2006, at 1A (“[M]any auditors and agency directors are holding their groups to Sarbanes-Oxley 
standards because Congress has indicated similar accounting laws for nonprofits are inevitable.”). 
 263. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §806(a), 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §1514A(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2003)). 
 264. Charles E. Berg, Testimony Concerning Sarbanes-Oxley at Four: Protecting Investors 
and Strengthening the Markets, 1579 PLI/CORP 331, 343 (Sept. 19, 2006) (discussing the 
testimony by Christopher Cox, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Before the U.S. House 
Committee on Financial Services (Jan. 4–5, 2007). 
 265. Tamara Loomis, Costs of Compliance Soar After Sarbanes-Oxley, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 
2003, at 1. 
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organizations that may be vulnerable due to detached governance.266  Further, 
financial mismanagement when an organization is not regulated, can be 
devastating, as seen with Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom.267  Arguably, 
Sarbanes-Oxley has aided in the restoration of investor confidence268 in 
publicly-traded companies through, among other measures, transparency and 
financial controls.269 
Sarbanes-Oxley can similarly benefit the largest nonprofit organizations, 
those with assets of $10,000,000 or more (“jumbo nonprofits”).270  In 2005, 
jumbo nonprofits represented 1% of nonprofits registered with the IRS and 6% 
of the returns filed by nonprofit charitable organizations.271  These nonprofits 
account for 90% of the total asset holdings and 83% of the total revenue 
reported by nonprofit charitable organizations.272 
Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms—if applied to jumbo nonprofits—would be a 
rational application of best practices, and would be more likely to achieve the 
desired results of transparency and strong governance.  This restrained 
application of Sarbanes-Oxley would track donor dollars and perhaps public 
interest to a larger degree than a broad application of similar reform to all 
nonprofits. 
D. What About the Little Guy?  Doesn’t He Need Reform? 
In a recent study of major nonprofit scandals reported between 1995 and 
2001, Margaret Gibelman and Sheldon R. Gelman concluded that poor 
governance was the principle source of nonprofit scandal.273  Their research 
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Come to Terms with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, U. BUS., July 1, 2007, at 76; Erin Massey Everitt, 
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Increased Liability?, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 225, 226–27 (2008) (discussing the impetus of 
increased accountability of corporate officers). 
 268. Andy Serwer, Stop Whining About SarbOx!, FORTUNE, Aug. 7, 2006, at 39 (noting that 
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 269. Loomis, supra note 265, at 1. 
 270. Bragg, supra note 219, at A1. 
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Organizations, 28 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 270, 271 (2008). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Margaret Gibelman & Sheldon R. Gelman, Very Public Scandals: Nongovernmental 
Organizations in Trouble, 12 VOLUNTAS: INT’L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORG. 49, 58 
(2001). 
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found that a lack of oversight and accountability left the nonprofits vulnerable 
to exploitation.274 
The application of Sarbanes-Oxley-like reform for the nonprofits sector en 
masse is ill conceived.  The nonprofit sector is heterogeneous.275  As Gerald 
Blanchard explains, “Over two-thirds of all 501(c)(3) organizations have less 
than $25,000 in gross receipts and represent everything from the 
school/parent/teacher organizations to local sports leagues.”276  The 
organizations which are not necessarily business-like ventures are less likely to 
have savvy boards and should not be squeezed into the for-profit regulatory 
mold of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Nonprofits have unique attributes that should be 
respected as we move toward reform.  Reform in this area must be respectful 
and innovative in order to accurately value the organizations and their 
missions.  Before the Senate Finance Committee, Diana Aviv, CEO of 
Independent Sector, explained the following: 
In the last 25 years, the charitable sector has grown considerably and some of 
its leaders are not familiar with good governance practices.  The legal 
framework has not kept pace with growth, and the diversity of organizations, 
and public resources are not sufficient to ensure that laws governing the sector 
are properly enforced.  The forms 990 and 990 PF filed annually by charities 
and foundations too often are inaccurate and inconsistent.  These current 
challenges do not lend themselves to quick fixes.  Changes must be given 
careful consideration and tested before sector-wide reform is implemented.277 
The goal of nonprofit reform is to increase the likelihood of the agencies’ 
positive outcomes in terms of service delivery and mission accomplishment, 
while decreasing the opportunity for fraud and mismanagement through 
systematic reforms that focus on transparency, independence, ethics, and 
honesty. 
III.  GUIDANCE FOR NONPROFIT REFORM 
The wholesale application of Sarbanes-Oxley to the nonprofit sector with 
the goals of sound governance, transparency, and accountability is shortsighted 
and impracticable.  Sarbanes-Oxley-like reform is best suited for the largest 
nonprofits, which actually function more like corporations.  There are lessons 
that all nonprofits can take away from Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Strong leadership from the chairman of the board or the executive director 
is necessary for proactive nonprofit reform.  When leadership is not interested 
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 275. Charity Oversight Hearing, supra note 241, at 44 (statement of Prof. Derek Bok, 
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in positive board change reactive reform can be seen in times of crisis such as 
the untimely departure of the founder, financial pressures, or ethical problems.  
Highly visible moments or transition, stress, or even crisis within an institution 
or a board, however traumatic, are particularly promising windows of 
opportunity for the chairman of the board or the executive director to initiate 
board development efforts.278  Purposeful governance at the board level, 
through and by independent directors, is critical to the nonprofit sector.  
Committee work should be taken seriously.  Those engaged in the work of 
shaping the future of the nonprofit should assess the board, its structure, and its 
needs.  This process should culminate in focused director recruitment and 
training.  In terms of finances, nonprofit directors should concern themselves 
with audits, compensation matters, and executive evaluation.  Additionally, 
nonprofits should develop and adopt document retention plans, and policies 
addressing whistle-blowers, conflicts of interest, codes of ethics, and nepotism. 
Nonprofit directors must specifically focus intently on, and, in some 
instances, sharpen the mission of their nonprofit.  This mission should guide 
the nonprofit in defining objectives, conducting daily activities, providing 
client services and strategic planning—all aided through decisions of the board 
and activities of the staff.  A nonprofit adhering to mission-based principles 
should be well positioned to seek and train the most qualified directors, 
executives, and staff.  A nonprofit’s ability to recruit, train, and retain high-
quality people in key roles is important to the work of the nonprofit in terms of 
fundraising and client services. 
A. The Mission as a Template; Enhancing the Duty of Obedience 
Nonprofits, irrespective of size, can benefit from a recommitment to their 
missions by thinking about recruiting, training, and retaining directors, and 
conducting succession planning.  The first step for a board is to establish or 
reaffirm its mission.279  There are several books on mission-based management 
that provide direction on using the mission statement as a template for daily 
activities.280  These resources and others provide direction on using the mission 
statement as a template to board activities.281  The goal of mission-based 
 
 278. RICHARD P. CHAIT ET AL., IMPROVING THE PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNING BOARDS 21 
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formulate a mission statement). 
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management is to ensure that the agency is carrying out its duties in a manner 
that focuses attention on the mission of the organization.282  A one-step 
implementation of this principle is to instruct directors to spot check their work 
by asking the fundamental question: “Have my actions advanced the mission 
of the organization?”283  If responses to this question are not clearly yes, then 
the board should reconsider the action.  Periodic review of the mission helps to 
ensure that newer directors both understand and acknowledge that they are a 
part of the articulation of the mission.284 
1. Conducting a Needs Assessment 
Once a board has established its mission, there are ways to make sure the 
organization utilizes and advances the purpose of this mission.  Conducting a 
needs assessment is crucial to the board’s ability to do its job and carry out its 
mission in a consistent manner.285  Members of the board need to work 
together to identify the needs of the nonprofit.286  An organization can assess 
its needs and determine its priorities by examining existing data and 
conducting attitude surveys, community forums, or focus group interviews.287  
Each organization must determine which method will be the most effective and 
useful for them.288  Once an organization determines its needs and priorities, it 
must establish a plan to further provide methods and strategies to fulfill these 
needs.289 
This leads the board into the next essential area: Communication.  
Informing the community and the organizations stakeholders of the needs of 
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the organization in order for it to carry out its mission is crucial.290  Using the 
results of the needs assessment and sharing the nonprofit entity’s priorities 
with stakeholders is an essential element for the success of community-based 
organizations and other nonprofits.291 
2. Communication 
Caucusing with stakeholders and engaging in team building is perhaps the 
most effective way to communicate the needs and mission of the organization.  
Stakeholders are the people who hold an interest in the organization and want 
to see it succeed.292  This category includes funders, clients, community 
members, local politicians, advocates, those who believe in the mission, and 
those who can influence others through social networks or other means to 
support the mission.293  When stakeholders know the needs of the organization, 
they can provide strategies and incentives to others in order to meet these 
needs. 
For example, the Social Equity Caucus operating out of California includes 
nine Bay Area counties and has met since 1998 “on a quarterly basis to share 
information and strategies, network, and develop a unified vision of social 
equality for the region.”294  This caucus provides members with a chance to 
receive feedback and information from its stakeholders and allows those 
members to provide ideas and recommendations for the future. 
Team building can strengthen an organization and increase productivity 
and dedication to the organization.295  Once a board looks past the simple text 
of its mission and works to include the stakeholders of the organization, they 
have a better chance to advance this mission.  Communicating the mission and 
the priorities of a nonprofit entity is essential to fundraising and effective 
operations.  This communication can be a powerful tool for both external 
constituents and employees. 
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3. Internal Investment 
The next step in advancing an organization’s mission is to take time to 
educate the staff and middle management about the mission and the priorities 
of the nonprofit entity.  The staff and middle management are the face of the 
organization and its key communicators.296  Middle managers play a unique 
and effective role in a company and can help maintain an organization.297  
They are generally good at motivating and boosting the morale of their 
employees.298  Adoption of mission-based management is an important step in 
the development process and can also play a role in carrying out an 
organization’s vision.  Treating an employee well, through respect and 
involvement, will produce high-quality employees who not only continue to 
come to work each day, but also bring a level of commitment to the 
organization while they work.299  Employees who understand and support the 
organization can be instrumental in advancing the mission. 
B. Recruiting and Retaining Directors 
Nonprofit directors do not reap the monetary benefits that they may receive 
as for-profit directors, such as dividends or stipends.300  This, coupled with the 
public’s growing interest in holding directors legally accountable for poor 
decisions, makes the search for willing and capable directors a difficult task.  
Recently, judges in Delaware were willing to give less deference to directors’ 
business decisions.301  Such judicial decisions do not help alleviate the high 
demand and low supply of qualified and willing directors. 
There are several factors that will attract good, independent candidates.302  
A well-articulated mission is important because a director will forward the 
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mission to others in fundraising events.  The mission should also be broad 
enough for a potential director to accept and support it.303  The candidate will 
need to believe their participation will further the mission.304  Another helpful 
factor is branding or prestige.  This will attract skillful directors because the 
corporation’s brand will open doors—professional as well as social.  The 
candidates for directorship should believe in the leadership and vision of the 
CEO.  Clearly written expectations and duties will also attract qualified board 
members because they will want to work for an organization that is respectful 
of their time.305 
A necessary step in this process is defining or identifying specific 
recruitment needs.  The board committee assigned to recruitment should 
consider qualifications such as leadership, work ethic, commitment to the 
mission, community connections, management style, expertise, other 
commitments, and demographics.306  The board should have an attorney for his 
reasoning skills, an accountant for her financial skills, and a specialist from the 
field in which nonprofit corporation deals.  For example, if the nonprofit 
corporation is a hospital, the board should have a physician and a health care 
administrator.  The board committee for recruitment can use a “recruiting 
matrix” to evaluate the board as it exists and to identify gaps in desired 
characteristics.  Not only do some nonprofit websites have such matrices,307 
but there are professional recruitment firms that offer evaluation and 
recruitment strategies.308 
Another way to attract board members is to offer all possible precautions 
against personal liability.  The board should give copies of the Director and 
Officer (“D&O”) insurance policy to candidates.  They should offer the 
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maximum amount of indemnification available by law.309  The board should 
divulge gaps in coverage and help the director fill in the gaps.310  Finally, the 
board should assure renewal of the D&O policy. 
The board can assure its own quality by recruiting the best and the 
brightest.  New and talented board members come equipped with naïve 
questions and energy.  These unique resources motivate the board as a whole 
and may lead the board to question its method of operations.311  The 
opportunity to work with qualified and competent directors will benefit 
recruitment and retention.  An effective code of ethics, clearly defined duties, 
and annual evaluations will assist in maintaining the board’s quality.  New 
directors should go through orientation and training.  To increase new board 
member investment in the nonprofit, they should be given options in defining 
their role in the nonprofit.  For example, they should be able to choose between 
a variety of committees, advisory boards, and/or executive board positions.312 
Compensation is an effective recruiting method, and the nonprofit may 
consider compensating its board members.313  The board, however, should be 
careful with respect to the compensation of members.314  It is also important 
for the corporation to abide by the laws of the state of incorporation and IRS 
rules and regulations.  Given the complexities in compensating board 
members, it may not be wise to compensate board members if doing so would 
 
 309. ABA, GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 262 (George W. 
Overton & Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
 310. Id. 
 311. Naïve but useful questions can include the following:  What is on the agenda for this 
meeting?  Why do we need to complete this form?  Can I take a look at the balance sheet? 
 312. Bol, supra note 303, at 30. 
 313. See RUNQUIST, supra note 53, at 86–87. 
 314. Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling through the Gaps 
Between Law and Practice, 76 FDMLR 521, 544 n.104 (2007) (citing In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)).  One issue in Disney addressed whether only the full 
board, rather than just the compensation committee, could set the financial terms of the contract 
with incoming president Michael Ovitz.  Compensation can be a sensitive topic for many exempt 
organizations, particularly charities, and the visibility of the Form 990 suggests that the full board 
at least should be aware of the compensation it pays to directors, officers, and top executives 
before the public.); Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos § I. (Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
N.Y. Feb. 10, 1997); Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); 
Alec Macgillis, The Princely Habits of College Presidents, BALT. SUN, Oct. 2, 2005, at 1F 
(discussing the spending habits of four university presidents); see ABA COORDINATING COMM. 
ON NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE, GUIDE TO NONPROFIT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE WAKE 
OF SARBANES-OXLEY 45 (2005); see also Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 330 cmt. 
b(1), reporter’s notes 1–6 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); Ralph E. DeJong & Michael W. 
Peregrine, Director Compensation Plans for Nonprofit: Addressing the Key Legal Issues, 30 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 29 (2000). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] SEEKING MEANINGFUL NONPROFIT REFORM 233 
 
mean abdicating nonprofit status.315  A complex decision such as this one is a 
reason to find, recruit, and retain competent directors. 
C. Training Directors 
Once the board attracts qualified directors, it is crucial to train them.  
Maintaining a quality board will help recruit and retain the best directors.  The 
first opportunity to train new directors is during recruiting.  The candidate will 
learn about the mission and the organization during this time, and they will 
learn about certain risks and duties of directorship in the nonprofit arena. 
The next best opportunity for training is orientation.316  The new board 
member should be given two manuals.317  One manual should contain relevant 
information that they may leave at home.318  Relevant information consists of, 
at a minimum, a history of the corporation, the corporation’s structure, its 
culture, and sample documents for proxies.319  The other should contain 
information that they may need to reference at meetings, such as the charter, 
bylaws, proper meeting procedure, the current mission statement, a list of other 
directors, and the organization’s annual calendar of events.320 
There are other ways to engage and train directors.  One way to engage and 
train directors is to hold annual retreats.  Annual retreats can renew individual 
commitment to the organization and its mission.  They can act like extended 
board meetings to further an agenda.  Also, retreats enhance relationships and 
build personal rapport.  Another method to engage and train directors is to hold 
training sessions.  If funding permits, the board should consider hiring experts 
on a short-term basis to conduct training.  Additionally, there are many state 
and federally-sponsored training classes that focus on board development and 
director duties.  A third, and highly successful method of engaging and training 
directors, is to create a board mentoring program.321  Additionally, boards 
should consider adopting a continuing board education requirement.  If the 
board adopts such a requirement, both new and old members would be 
required to attend a certain number of hours of training each year.  Continuous 
training teaches board members new skills and reinforce best practices. 
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D. Executive Succession—A Missing Link, Transitions, and Looking Toward 
the Future 
Attracting and maintaining an educated and contributing board is 
imperative.  In addition to the legal duties of nonprofit boards, there are several 
areas where the board’s work is required.  Numerous articles discuss 
fundraising as a role of the board.322  Less attention, however, has been given 
to one of the board’s most important functions: continuous investment in 
succession planning.  While experience can, of course, be of great value in 
board service, this very strong emphasis on retention raises concerns about 
possible entrenchment and poor succession planning.323  Assuming that 
nonprofit boards—already undercompensated and overworked—can keep 
nonprofits afloat, in compliance with applicable laws, and well funded, 
executive succession often threatens nonprofit organizations as the next major 
hurdle.324 
Executive Director succession is one of the leading causes of nonprofit 
failure in terms of providing services.325  Succession planning should be 
considered by the board as well as the executive staff of the organization.  The 
development of any succession plan should be an evolutionary process from 
which organizational strengths and weaknesses can be identified and 
addressed, if necessary. 
E. Making the Most of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Borrowing some of the principles from Sarbanes-Oxley could prove 
effective for nonprofits.  Specifically, the requirements of certification, an 
independent audit committee, and internal controls, as required by Sarbanes-
Oxley, could help nonprofits run more effectively, sustain a healthy 
corporation, and fulfill their mission statement. 
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 324. See Joseph Santora et al., Succession in Nonprofit Organizations: An Insider/Outsider 
Perspective, 72 S.A.M. 26, 26 (2007). 
 325. See generally Joseph C. Santora & James C. Sarros, CEO Succession in Nonprofit 
Community Based Organizations, in CAREER DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL 107 (2001). 
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1. Certification 
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief 
Financial Officer (or their equivalent) certify financial records.326  The 
signatures on these statements by those who are in charge of overseeing these 
records further certify the accuracy and importance of the documents.  Having 
the directors or those in charge of the financial records acknowledge the 
accuracy of the statements will aid nonprofits with financial accountability and 
transparency. 
2. Independent Audit Committee 
Nonprofits could benefit from enhanced audit oversight through the work 
of an independent audit committee.  If an auditor is too close to the inner 
workings of the organization, it will be hard to maintain control and remain 
objective.327  A nonprofit, using an independent audit committee, would have 
an effective way to remain in control and have an objective point-of-view, 
ensuring a good financial process able to detect and perhaps prevent financial 
mismanagement. 
3. Internal Controls 
While it is important for an organization to have an independent audit 
system, it is also very useful to establish internal controls of an organization.  
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) has established 
its own set of internal operations to evaluate their financial auditing 
methods.328  The PCAOB focuses on evaluating several areas, such as 
identifying the risks to integrity and effectiveness of programs, implementing 
ways to improve in the area of integrity and effectiveness, keeping reports of 
the performance and finances, examining and following laws that apply, 
implementing safeguards and utilizing resources, and continually protecting 
and promoting the integrity and efficiency of the organization and its auditing 
measures.329  It would be useful for a nonprofit to follow the lead of the 
PCAOB and establish an effective method for internal control, including but 
not limited to, policies, practices of self-examination, and internal guidelines 
 
 326. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat. 745, 806 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 327. Donald K. McConnell, Jr. & George Y. Banks, How Sarbanes-Oxley Will Change the 
Audit Process, J. ACCT., Sept. 2003, at 49, 49. 
 328. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Internal Oversight, http://www.pcao 
bus.org/ABout_the_PCAOB/Internal_Oversight/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 329. Id. 
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for processes.  There are many sites a nonprofit can use to help them develop 
and maintain internal controls.330 
As a summary, Chart 1 in Appendix A groups nonprofit organizations 
according to asset size and recommends appropriate adaptations of Sarbanes-
Oxley.  These adaptations, if found to be desirable practices, should be added 
to the current nonprofit manuals, charters, and bylaws. 
CONCLUSION 
Nonprofits who adopt procedures and rules similar to those required by 
Sarbanes-Oxley in the for-profit context will not pass a litmus test for 
appropriate governance.  Yet, implementing certain measures makes it more 
likely that directors and the executive staff are asking the right questions, 
making it more likely than not that the appropriate actions will be taken.  The 
call for stringent Sarbanes-Oxley-style reforms in the nonprofit sector is overly 
broad.  The potential reforms fail to recognize the distinctions between various 
types of nonprofits and, as a result, attempt to force corporate reforms onto 
nonprofit organizations. 
Revisiting the stories of John and Jeff, strong training and orientation for 
Jeff would empower him to carry out his legal duties while monitoring and 
managing the nonprofit organization.  A knowledgeable and engaged nonprofit 
board has a better chance of ensuring that the organization’s mission is carried 
out and that clients like John receive the care they deserve. 
  
 
 330. See, e.g., Softrax, Do You Have Internal Control of Your Revenue?, http://www.soft 
rax.com/mk/get/sox404checklist_ppc?utm_content=sox_business_controls_sarbanes_oxley_audit
_dynamic (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Business Owner’s Toolkik, Establishing Internal Controls, 
http://www.toolkit.com/small_business_guide/sbg.aspx?nid=P04_8260 (last visited Jan. 11, 
2010); State Bar of Texas, How to Establish Internal Controls, http://www.texasbarcle.com/cle/ 
site/LawOfficeMgmtBrochures/Controls.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
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APPENDIX A  
Chart 1: Suggested Methods of Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Based on Size of 
Nonprofit 
 
SOX 
Requirements 
for reporting 
companies331 
 
 
 
Jumbo 
Nonprofit  
(in excess of 
$10,000,000 
in assets) 
 
Large 
Nonprofits  
($1,000,000 
to 
$10,000,000 
in assets) 
Medium 
Nonprofits  
($100,000 to 
$1,000,000 in 
assets) 
Small 
Nonprofits  
(less than 
$100,000 in 
assets) 
1.  Auditing332  
Auditor 
independence 
is required. 
Auditor 
independence 
is required. 
Auditor 
independence 
is required. 
The board 
should have an 
audit 
committee and 
should recruit 
board 
members with 
expertise in 
the areas of 
accounting 
and auditing.  
The audit 
committee 
should work 
closely with 
accounting 
professionals.  
Procedures 
should be set 
up to detect 
fraud. 
The board 
should obtain 
training 
regarding 
financial 
matters for all 
board 
members.  If 
possible the 
board should 
have a 
separate 
person or 
volunteer 
within the 
organizations 
to maintain the 
financial 
records.  
Hiring an 
auditor might 
be cost 
prohibitive.  
 
 331. See Paul Arnsberger, Charities, Labor and Agricultural, and Other Tax-Exempt 
Organizations, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN (2008) (providing the numbers for this chart). 
 332. Auditing under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is “an examination of the financial statements of 
any issuer by an independent public accounting firm in accordance with the rules of the Board or 
the Commission (or, for the period preceding the adoption of applicable rules of the Board under 
section 103, in accordance with then-applicable generally accepted auditing and related standards 
for such purposes), for the purpose of expressing an opinion on such statements.”  Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 2, 116 Stat. 745, 747 (2002). 
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SOX 
Requirements 
for reporting 
companies331 
 
 
 
Jumbo 
Nonprofit  
(in excess of 
$10,000,000 
in assets) 
 
Large 
Nonprofits  
($1,000,000 
to 
$10,000,000 
in assets) 
Medium 
Nonprofits  
($100,000 to 
$1,000,000 in 
assets) 
Small 
Nonprofits  
(less than 
$100,000 in 
assets) 
2. Corporate 
Responsibility333 
 
 
a.  Director 
Independence 
 
 
 
Directors 
should not 
have material 
relationships 
with the 
organization. 
 
 
 
Directors 
should not 
have material 
relationships 
with the 
organization. 
 
 
 
Directors 
should not 
have material 
relationships 
with the 
organization. 
Directors 
should try to 
steer away 
from material 
relationships.  
However, 
there is the 
possibility that 
directors may 
have material 
relationships 
with the 
agency.  These 
relationships 
should be 
formally 
disclosed to 
the directors 
and the 
director should 
indicate that 
the material 
relationship 
will not inhibit 
his fiduciary 
duties. 
Directors 
might wear 
many hats in 
small 
organizations.  
It is very 
possible that 
only 
interested, 
non-
independent 
persons are 
available for 
board service.  
Directors may 
have material 
relationships 
with the 
agency.  These 
relationships 
should be 
formally 
disclosed to 
the directors 
and the 
director should 
indicate that 
the material 
relationship 
will not inhibit 
his fiduciary 
duties. 
 
 333. Corporate responsibility” is not an easily defined phrase because it means different 
things for different companies today. See Mallen Baker, Corporate Social Responsibility—What 
Does it Mean?, http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/CSRfiles/definition.html (last visited Jan. 11, 
2010); Maggi S. Hill, Corporate Social Responsibility–The Responsible Thing to Do, MERCER 
BUS., May 1, 2007, at 6;  NYSE Euronext, Listed Company Manual, § 303A.00-01: Corporate 
Governance Standards and Independent Directors (2009), available at http://nyse 
manual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections; NASDAQ OMX, NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, IM 5605: 
Definition of Independence—Rule 5605(a)(2) (2009), available at http://nasdaq.cchwall 
street.com. 
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SOX 
Requirements 
for reporting 
companies331 
 
 
 
Jumbo 
Nonprofit  
(in excess of 
$10,000,000 
in assets) 
 
Large 
Nonprofits  
($1,000,000 
to 
$10,000,000 
in assets) 
Medium 
Nonprofits  
($100,000 to 
$1,000,000 in 
assets) 
Small 
Nonprofits  
(less than 
$100,000 in 
assets) 
b. Committees 
 
The board 
should have a 
number of 
committees.  
These 
committees 
should be 
comprised of 
independent 
directors and 
should have 
charters 
publicly 
available. 
Each 
committee 
should have 
governing 
standards. 
 
The board 
should have a 
number of 
committees.  
These 
committees 
should be 
comprised of 
independent 
directors and 
should have 
charters 
publicly 
available. 
Each 
committee 
should have 
governing 
standards. 
The board 
should have a 
number of 
committees.  
These 
committees 
should be 
comprised of 
independent 
directors and 
should have 
charters 
publicly 
available. 
Each 
committee 
should have 
governing 
standards. 
The board 
committee 
should serve 
as a liaison 
from the board 
to the staff.  
Committees 
should cover 
finance, 
human 
resources, 
audit, and 
budget.  There 
will be 
instances 
where the 
board will 
need staff to 
sit on the 
committees.  
Committee 
rules and 
responsibilities 
should be 
established. 
The board 
committee 
should serve 
as a liaison 
from the board 
to the staff.  
Committees 
should cover 
finance, 
human 
resources, 
audit, and 
budget.  There 
will be 
instances 
where the 
board will 
need staff to 
sit on the 
committees.  
Committee 
rules and 
responsibilities 
should be 
established.   
Independent, 
non-interested 
board 
members may 
not be 
available for 
committee 
service. 
c. Governance 
Have a 
statement by 
your 
nonprofit that 
establishes 
what you 
believe 
corporate 
governance 
should entail 
for your 
nonprofit. 
Have a 
statement by 
your 
nonprofit that 
establishes 
what you 
believe 
corporate 
governance 
should entail 
for your 
nonprofit. 
Have a 
statement by 
your 
nonprofit that 
establishes 
what you 
believe 
corporate 
governance 
should entail 
for your 
nonprofit. 
Have a 
statement by 
your nonprofit 
that 
establishes 
what you 
believe 
corporate 
governance 
should entail 
for your 
nonprofit. 
Have a 
statement by 
your nonprofit 
that 
establishes 
what you 
believe 
corporate 
governance 
should entail 
for your 
nonprofit. 
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SOX 
Requirements 
for reporting 
companies331 
 
 
 
Jumbo 
Nonprofit  
(in excess of 
$10,000,000 
in assets) 
 
Large 
Nonprofits  
($1,000,000 
to 
$10,000,000 
in assets) 
Medium 
Nonprofits  
($100,000 to 
$1,000,000 in 
assets) 
Small 
Nonprofits  
(less than 
$100,000 in 
assets) 
d. Code of 
Ethics 
Disclose 
whether a 
code of 
ethics has or 
has not been 
adopted. 
Ethical 
guidelines 
should be 
aspirational 
and 
disseminated 
throughout 
the agency.  
Leadership 
from the 
board 
regarding 
ethics can set 
the tone for 
ethical 
behavior.  
Ethical 
guidelines 
should be 
aspirational 
and 
disseminated 
throughout 
the agency.  
Leadership 
from the 
board 
regarding 
ethics can set 
the tone for 
ethical 
behavior.  
Ethical 
guidelines 
should be 
aspirational 
and 
disseminated 
throughout the 
agency.  
Leadership 
from the board 
regarding 
ethics can set 
the tone for 
ethical 
behavior and 
ensure that the 
code is 
manageable 
and visible. 
Ethical 
guidelines 
should be 
aspirational 
and 
disseminated 
throughout the 
agency.  
Leadership 
from the board 
regarding 
ethics can set 
the tone for 
ethical 
behavior and 
ensure that the 
code is 
manageable 
and visible. 
3. Financial 
Matters 
Matters that 
significantly 
impact the 
financial 
statements 
should be 
disclosed and 
financial 
statements 
must be 
certified. 
Matters that 
significantly 
impact the 
financial 
statements 
should be 
disclosed to 
funders and 
other 
stakeholders.  
These 
statements 
should be 
certified by 
an 
independent 
financial 
auditor and 
the CEO. 
Matters that 
significantly 
impact the 
financial 
statements 
should be 
disclosed to 
funders and 
other 
stakeholders.  
These 
statements 
should be 
certified by 
an 
independent 
financial 
auditor and 
the CEO. 
Matters that 
will impact 
financial 
statements 
should be 
shared with 
the board by 
the CEO and 
the CFO.  
When 
problems 
regarding cash 
flow or 
funding are 
discussed, a 
financial 
professional 
should be 
engaged to 
lead the 
discussion and 
to provide 
assistance in 
resolution.  
These matters 
should be 
shared with 
funders. 
The CFO 
should make 
periodic 
reports to the 
Board 
regarding the 
financial status 
of the 
organization.  
Matters that 
will adversely 
impact the 
financial 
health of the 
organization 
should be 
addressed with 
the board as 
soon as 
practicable.  
The board 
should 
communicate 
financial 
concerns to 
funders and 
seek outside 
assistance. 
 
 
